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Joan Monras
The eld of economics studies the interaction of human decisions in the market. To a
rst approximation, consumers demand products in exchange for their labor and rms use
their labor to produce those goods. But what is the market?
Oftentimes we make the simplifying assumption that the market is a country. That
is, we detach the market from any particular geographic location, except when considering
various countries interacting. An aggregate national economy is, however, a collection of
many local economies. People live in particular locations and work there. Labor supply is,
thus, fundamentally local (Moretti, 2011).
This simple rationale might help to understand the recent surge of literature trying to
understand precise adjustment to shocks in local labor markets (see (Autor et al., Forthcom-
ing), (Autor et al., 2013b), (Autor et al., 2013a), (Beaudry et al., 2010), (Hornbeck, 2012),
(Hornbeck and Naidu, 2012), (Notowidigdo, 2013), (Diamond, 2013)). The study of this
problem opens up a variety of challenging questions, the most basic one being whether we
really need to be looking at local labor markets or whether adjustment occurs purely at the
national level.
Most of the literature has taken one of two rather radical assumptions, of which there are
many examples in the economic literature on immigration. On the one hand, some authors
like George Borjas argue that the US national labor market is so well integrated that local
shocks are (almost) irrelevant and that any eect that international immigration may have
had can only be observed at the national level (see (Borjas, 2003)). On the other, David
Card and some other authors, in a number of papers, use local labor markets as their units of
analysis, implicitly assuming that local labor markets are suciently unrelated that shocks
to particular markets have lasting consequences (see (Card, 2001) or (Card, 1990)). Using
one view or the other leads to radically dierent understandings of the eect of immigration
on US workers, precluding a consensus on the actual eects of immigration on host countries.
In the rst chapter of this dissertation, entitled Dynamic Internal Migration I ex-
plain the underlying model guiding the empirical applications in the subsequent two chapters.
The model is dynamic in the sense that I am interested in the ways in which internal ows of
workers across regions react to local shocks, rather than in the ways long-run distributions
of people across space behave. The view of the US labor market presented in this chapter,
and then used in the subsequent two chapters, is more dynamic than in previous research.
In the long-run equilibrium there are constant ows of people moving between the various
regions of the country. These internal ows, however, are equalized across locations and thus
the equilibrium is stable. If this equilibrium is shocked, by either an inow of workers or a
change in local technologies, it will adapt. For this to be possible, the local labor demand
needs to be downward sloping in population and upward sloping in technology  otherwise
wages would not react to local shocks and the equilibrium would not change. Under these
conditions, a negative shock at the local level results in reduced in-migration rates into the
region, which become, in turn, local labor supply shocks in non-aected regions. This spreads
the initial local shock to the rest of the economy. All these steps are carefully explained in
the rst chapter.
In the second chapter, entitled Immigration and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from
the Mexican Peso Crisis , I study how an immigration-induced labor supply shock is
absorbed into the economy. Mexico  the country that sends the most migrants to the
US  entered a deep and unexpected crisis in late December 1994. This prompted many
Mexicans to migrate to the US and stopped some migrants already in the US from returning
to Mexico. This combination increased net inows of Mexican immigrants to the US by
around 50 percent in 1995.
Mexican migration is primarily low skilled, young, and concentrated in certain historical
settlements. I use these facts to examine what happened to US workers competing with
Mexicans right after the crisis hit Mexico in 1995. In the short run, the wages of native
low-skilled workers in high immigration states decreased as a consequence of the increased
competition created by the large and unexpected net inow of Mexicans. This then prompted
some interstate relocation of low-skilled workers. Fewer young low-skilled natives migrated
towards high immigration states than in typical years, spreading the shock across the US
territory. In the long run, wages in high immigration states returned to their pre-shock
trend three years after the shock. This paper reconciles conicting views in the literature
and shows the exact mechanisms through which immigration shocks are absorbed into the
US labor force.
In Economic Shocks and Internal Migration: Evidence from the Great Re-
cession I study a closely related question. Instead of using a local labor supply shock, I
look at what happens when the severity of a national crisis is more pronounced in particular
locations. In 2008, the US entered a severe crisis that mainly aected the construction and
nancial sectors. Either because of decreased demand for labor in construction or because
of decreased demand for local goods in highly indebted counties, following (Mian and Su,
2013) arguments, the Great Recession can be understood as a negative local labor demand
shock that hit particular locations more severely than others.
Contrary to the large and fast-growing body of literature on the Great Recession (see for
example (Mian and Su, 2013) and (Molloy et al., 2011)), I document how labor relocation
across metropolitan areas helped mitigate the local shocks. Rather than people out-migrating
from hard hit locations, I document that fewer people moved to these negatively-aected
locations. These might have alleviated up to a third of the intensity of local shocks.
It is worth noting that the internal relocation mechanism documented in both the immi-
gration and great recession papers, i.e., lower in-migration rates in aected locations, is very
similar. This is in line with the general model presented in the rst chapter.
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Conventional wisdom suggests that if a country or a city is hit by a negative shock, its
inhabitants will escape to another location (Rosen, 1974), (Roback, 1982) or (Glaeser, 2008).
Empirical evidence, however does not seem to support this view. For example, while the
Rust Belt cities have lost population over the last decades, its rather slow decline has puzzled
many researchers (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). Similarly, it is somewhat puzzling that, for
example, Spain, whose unemployment rate rose to almost 30 percent in 2010, did not see
its emigration rates increase substantially. Why is it that people do not leave negatively
shocked locations?
A related  and sometimes ignored  fact is that the gross ows of people between
locations are always larger than net ows, particularly in the United States. In fact, if we
pick two (suciently large) locations, there are always some people moving in both directions.
This means that, for example, there have always been people migrating to the economically
stagnant cities of the Rust Belt during the past decades, despite the fact that these cities
were losing population. Why did these people move into such economically unattractive
locations?
In this paper, I introduce a model with positive equilibrium bilateral ows between
locations where out-migration and in-migration do not need to respond symmetrically. The
migration decision is modeled in two simultaneous steps. First, people decide whether to
look for a potential destination  given the expected value of moving  or stay where they
are. Second, those people who have decided to move choose where to move to. Thus, if
there is a negative shock to a location s, outows will increase because more people in s will
decide to move. Potential in-migrants to s are people that decided to move from locations
other than s. With the shock, the value that they would get in s decreases, and are more
likely to move to an alternative location. The model, thus, allows for dierent responses of
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the in- and out- migration rates.
These theoretical results help to understand the empirical evidence presented in Monras
(2013a) and Monras (2013b). In Monras (2013b), I show empirically that the internal reloca-
tion response to an unexpected increase in the supply of low skilled workers in initially high
Mexican immigration states is not due to native out-migration rates increasing but rather
that in-migration rates of native young low skilled workers decreased. Similarly, in Monras
(2013a) I document that the internal relocation response to the Great Recession was that the
in-migration rates to the hard hit locations declined after 2008, while the out-migration rates
did not respond signicantly to the crisis across the dierent local labor markets. The results
illustrate that there are aggregate decreases in internal migration during recessions, which
is coming from workers not moving to the negatively aected locations. This is consistent
with the literature (Molloy et al., 2011) and (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2012).
In discussing internal relocation, it is important to understand to what extent it helps
insure local markets against negative shocks (Blanchard and Katz, 1992) and (Topel, 1986).
The fact that population does not seem to out-migrate more when the local labor market is
hit by a negative shock has been interpreted as evidence that internal relocation does not
insure against negative shocks (Yagan, 2014). This paper theoretically shows that this may
not be a sucient observation. If local labor demand is downward sloping  so that less
people moving into a location decreases wages  and there are bilateral ows in equilibrium,
decreased in-migration attenuate, to some extent, the local shocks.
In contrast to previous literature (Wozniak (2010), Moretti (2011), Kline (2010a), Moretti
and Kline (forthcoming), Notowidigdo (2013), Diamond (2013)), which has considered the
long-run equilibrium distribution of people across space, I model the dynamic migration
decision process (micro-founding previous work by Blanchard and Katz (1992) and more in
line with international migration papers such as Hanson and Grogger (2011) and Bertoli and
Fernandez-Huertas (2013)). In some respects this paper is more closely related to models of
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labor reallocation across sectors (Artuc et al. (2010), Kline (2010b) or Pilossoph (2013)). To
the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper that theoretically distinguishes responses of
in- and out-migration rates to either local shocks or shocks to particular sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the simple model and derive
all the main results under extreme value distributed taste draws. Section 3 shows that these
results can be embedded in more realistic models of the labor market that may be more
suitable for some empirical applications. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model has S regions, representing US states or metropolitan areas. There is a single nal
consumption good that is freely traded across regions, at no cost. There is a xed factor
of production, called land, which makes local labor demand downward sloping. Workers
live for innitely many periods, but they are myopic since they only care about the next
period's location.1 At each point in time they reside in a particular location s. Unexpected
permanent shocks can occur, that aect the local labor market conditions in each location.
Workers can then decide whether to stay or move somewhere else in the following period.
Workers are small relative to the labor market so they do not take into account the eect
they have on the labor market when relocating. Workers are also myopic in that they do
not form expectations on how other workers will react to local shocks.
I rst introduce a simplifying assumption to derive the main results. I relax this assump-
tion in the next section and show that it is not driving the main results.
Assumption 1. 1. There is only one type of labor
2. Individuals do not take into account distance between regions when relocating internally
1See Kennan and Walker (2011) for a discussion of this point.
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3. There is no unemployment in any of the local labor markets
4. Individuals do not take into account the future evolution of wages when relocating
5. There is no housing sector
1.2.1 Timing
The timing of the model is the following. At the beginning of each period an unexpected
permanent shock can happen in a location. Next, given the current distribution of workers
across locations, rms maximize prots and wages are determined. Lastly, given the wages
in the economy, workers decide where to live in the following period.
1.2.2 Production Function
The production function in all regions is the same: a perfectly competitive representative
rm producing according to:
Qs = Bs[θsK
ρ
s + (1− θs)Nρs ]1/ρ (1.1)
where Ns is labor and Ks is land. θs represents the dierent weights that the two factors
have in the production function, while ρ governs the elasticity of substitution between these
factors. Bs is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of each location. We could also introduce
factor augmenting technologies, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
1.2.3 Labor market
The marginal product of labor is:











where σ = 1/(1 − ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between land and workers. This
denes the labor demand curve.











We can normalize ps = 1.
1.2.4 Location Choice
The indirect utility of the workers is given by the local wage ws′ , the amenities As′ and the
idiosyncratic draw they get for location s′, given that they live in s:
lnV is′ = lnVs′ + ε
i
s′ = lnAs′ + lnws′ + ε
i
s,s′ (1.4)
Note that the indirect utility has a common component to all workers lnVs′ that depends
on variables at destination and an idiosyncratic component εis,s′ specic to each worker.
It is also important to note that workers decide on future location given the current wages
across locations. This is an optimal behavior if two things hold. First, workers do not expect
shocks to happen in any location in the future. Second, workers do not form expectations




{lnVs′ + εis,s′} (1.5)
The general solution to this maximization problem gives the probability that an individual
i residing in a location s moves to s′, given current wages and valuations of amenities A, w:
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pis,s′ = ps,s′(A,w) (1.6)
By the law of large numbers we can then use equation (1.6) to obtain the ow of people
between s and s′:
Ps,s′ = p
i
s,s′ ∗Ns for s 6= s′ (1.7)
where Ns is the population residing in s. Note that this denes a matrix that represents
the ows of people between any two locations in the economy.
1.2.5 Dynamics
By denition, the number of individuals in s at time t is the number of individuals who were
living in that location (possibly times the natural growth rate ns, which I assume to be 0)
plus those who arrive minus those who leave:
N ′s = Ns + Is −Os (1.8)
Thus, internal relocation can take place through either in-migration or through out-
migration. We can use the denition of the ow of people across locations to dene the in-














This notation is useful for the derivation of some of the results.
1.2.6 Equilibrium
The denition of the equilibrium has two parts. I start by dening the equilibrium in the
short run. It satises two conditions. First, rms take as given the productivity Bs, the
productivity of each factor θs and factor prices in each location to maximize prots. Second,
labor markets clear in each location. This equates the supply and the demand for labor and
determines the wage in every local labor market. More formally:
Denition I. A short-run equilibrium is dened by the following decisions:
• Given {θs, Bs, σ, ws, rs}s∈S rms maximize prots.
• Labor and land markets clear in each s ∈ S so that {ws, rs} is determined.
Note that in the short-run, the two factors of production are xed. At the end of the
period relocation takes place which determines the distribution of workers across space in
the following period. We can dene the long-run equilibrium by adding an extra condition
to the short-run denition. In words, I say that the economy is in long-run equilibrium when
bilateral ows of people are equalized across regions. More specically,
Denition II. Given {θs, Bs, σ, As}s∈S xed, a long-run equilibrium is dened as a short-run
equilibrium with equalized bilateral ows of population across locations. This is:
Ps,s′ = Ps′,s,∀s, s′ ∈ S
where the ows are determined by the location maximization problem introduced before.
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1.2.7 Properties of the model
In this section I describe the properties of this simple model. Most of these properties do
not depend on the simplifying assumptions 1 but it is worth introducing them in a simple
framework.
Mobility Properties under a nested logit ε
In this section I assume that the idiosyncratic taste shocks are drawn from a nested logit
distribution. This captures the following: the rst part of the decision is whether to stay in
s or whether to move out from s. The second part is where to move, if the decision in part
one was to move to. Figure 1.1 shows this nested structure.
Figure 1.1: Migration decision
Worker
i in s








Thus, I assume that ε are nested logit distributed idiosyncratic tastes valuations. The
rst nest represents the choice between staying in s or moving somewhere else. The second
nest is to decide where to move. This results in a closed form solution for the probability of
an individual moving from s to s′ that is exible enough to allow for asymmetric responses










where λ is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between dierent nodes in the
second nest (when people decide to move). Lower values of λ make people more sensitive to
the local economic conditions and relocation across local labor markets is thus faster.
Importantly, ηs is the fraction of people in s that decide to relocate. The expected value
of relocating for someone living in s is given by:






where γ is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution in the upper nest, i.e. between
staying or leaving the origin. I assume that λ < γ, i.e. the elasticity of substitution within










This simply says that if economic conditions elsewhere are good or economic conditions
in s are bad, a higher fraction of the population in s will try to look for a new destination.
In what follows I analyse how the population adapts to local shocks. It is convenient to
rst analyse how the various bilateral ows react when there is an unexpected shock in one
of the local labor markets. As will be clear from the proofs, the limiting case of an arbitrarily
large number of locations simplies the algebra considerably.
Lemma 2. If εis,s′ are i.i.d. and drawn from a nested logit distribution with shape parameters






















when the number of locations is arbitrarily large.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that there will be a rst order eect of shocks at destination that is
governed by 1/λ. If a potential destination s increases wages it will attract a larger number
of in-migrants from all the other locations. Similarly, if wages improve in s more workers who
were living in s will decide to stay in s. Finally, given the structure of the idiosyncratic taste
shocks, economic shocks to a third location will have a negligible impact on the bilateral
ows between two locations.
The following proposition discusses how much all these responses of the bilateral ows
translates into population changes.
Proposition 3. If εis,s′ are i.i.d. and drawn from a nested logit distribution with shape

















when the number of locations is arbitrarily large.
Proof. From N ′s =
∑











































For the second part of the proposition,
From N ′s =
∑
















Intuitively, proposition 3 says that a positive (resp. negative) shock will increase (resp.
decrease) the local population substantially and that it will have spillovers to the rest of the
local labor markets that did not experience this shock.






Proposition 3 also shows that relocation can come from changes in either in-migration
(which are governed by λ or changes in out-migration (governed by γ).
While it may seem attractive to think about population levels or changes in population
levels in light of the model, there remains the empirical challenge that there may be longer
underlying trends in the evolution of the distribution of workers across local labor markets.
One such trend is the movement of workers toward southern US states, which coincides with
the introduction of air conditioning (Glaeser, 2008). Failing to account for these underlying
trends (that can be introduced in the model easily by modelling the evolution of the amenity
levels) may result in erroneous conclusions on how responsive internal migration is to local
shocks (see a longer discussion in Monras (2013a)).3 It also hides the fact that net in- or
out-migration may be consequences of either changes in in-migration rates or changes in
out-migration rates, or both. I discuss this in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If εis,s′ are i.i.d. and drawn from a nested logit distribution with shape
parameters λ and γ then, in the environment dened by the model, we have that:









Proof. From Is =
∑


















So, we need to know ∂ lnPj,s
∂ lnws





3Likewise, we can model productivity evolutions to make the model consistent with the city growth
models, see Eeckhout (2004).
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Similarly, from Os =
∑
























This last proposition can be re-expressed in terms of migration rates, which may be
useful for empirical applications.4 This makes it convenient to analyze whether or not in-
and out-migration rates are equally responsive to local shocks and under what circumstances.
Corollary 5. If εis are i.i.d. and follow a type I Extreme Value distribution with shape























The out-migration rate is analogous.
4In- and out-migration rates are usually stationary series that are easier to analyze empirically.
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The propagation of a local shock
We have seen that if there is a shock aecting the labor market conditions in one location
there will be some adjustment. We have also seen that this adjustment can come dispropor-
tionately from changes in the in-migration rates than out-migration rates. Do these local
labor shocks spill over to non-aected locations? If the local labor demand is downward
sloping, changes in the distribution of people across space will indeed have consequences on
wages. Fewer people will move to the shocked location or more will leave which reduces
the labor supply in that location. This reduced migration becomes an increase in the labor
supply in the non-aected locations, which tends to equalize wages across locations. For all
this to happen we need downward sloping labor demands in the short-run. In this model,
this is a consequence of the xed factor of production.
Proposition 6. In the short-run local labor demand is downward sloping.














Long-run properties of the model
In this section I analyze the properties of the model in the long-run, i.e. when bilateral ows
between regions are equalized. The following two propositions characterize wage levels in the
cross-section in equilibrium. It shares many of the properties of standard spatial equilibrium
models that are usually meant to capture the long-run features, but it adds some nuances
(Rosen, 1974), (Roback, 1982), Glaeser (2008). It is worth noting from the beginning that
since there are no congestion costs  which can easily be introduced as is shown in the next
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section with a housing sector  indirect utilities are not equalized across locations in the
long-run if locations are of dierent sizes. With congestion costs this changes. This is so
because if we have two locations of dierent sizes and the bilateral ows are equalized, the
share of people moving out from the small location needs to be higher than that of the larger
location. I discuss this in some more detail below. Before doing so, I discuss whether there
are multiple long-run equilibria or not.
Proposition 7. There are multiple long-run equilibria. However, given an initial distribution
of people across space, there is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. The law of motion of the economy is given by:
N ′t+1 = Nt x Pt
where Pt is the matrix of bilateral ows at time t.
Given an initial distribution of people across space (N0), we can easily compute the
long-run equilibrium.
It is worth noting that this model is in line with the importance of location fundamentals
or path dependence  which would help to explain the initial distribution of people and
economic activity across space  and with the random growth theories  if technologies or
shocks are random (Davis and Weinstein, 2002). It would not be hard to include in the
model increasing returns to scale and transport costs. This is, however, left outside of the
model.
Corollary 8. In the long run, wages, net of per capita amenities, are equalized across local
labor markets, and consequently workers in particular local labor markets are fully insured
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against idiosyncratic shocks, which are absorbed nationally. This is the case even if out-
migration rates hardly respond to local shocks.
Note however, that  in absence of congestion costs  in order to sustain the larger
size, workers in big cities need to have higher equilibrium indirect utilities. So, the average
indirect utility of a worker that resides in s is Asws while in equilibrium Asws/(ηsNs)λ is
equalized across locations. This implies that workers in larger cities Ns have either higher
wages or higher amenities that they directly value or lower out-migration rates. There is a
large amount of literature documenting that larger cities in fact pay higher wages Duranton
and Puga (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2004) or, more recently, Combes et al. (2012)5.
These are usually justied as positive agglomeration externalities that make workers more
productive in larger cities.
Corollary 9. In the long run, in absence of congestion costs, larger cities either pay higher
wages or have higher levels of amenities.
We can introduce some further simplifying assumptions to the model to link it to previous
studies in the literature. In fact, a relevant question, particularly in the macro literature,
is this: to what extent can we ignore dierent local labor markets and consider only an
integrated aggregate economy (Lucas and Prescott, 1974)?
Corollary 10. If the local production is the same across regions (θs = θ, ∀s ∈ S), the
economy aggregates to the canonical model (Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Katz and Murphy
(1992)).









s + (1− θ)Nρs ]1/ρ (1.17)
5Traditionally, economists argued that this compensated the bad amenities in the big cities. This view
has been called into question by recent papers (Albouy, 2013), (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
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Now, in the long-run equilibrium the share of workers is proportional across regions. We





ρ + (1− θ)Nρ]1/ρ (1.18)
From this last proposition we can also see that if the second fact was also mobile (at
least in the long-run), this would change the distribution of economic activities across space
toward the regions that experience positive shocks or away from the ones that experience
negative shocks.
1.3 Extensions
This section discusses what happens when we relax Assumption 1.
1.3.1 Two types of labor
This section discusses a case in which instead of a xed factor we have two mobile factors.
One can think, for example, of high and low skilled workers. There are two ways in which
we can extend the model to incorporate two types of mobile labor. First, we can assume
that amenities are valued by the dierent types of workers similarly. Alternatively, we can
assume skill-specic preferences for amenity levels.
None of the previous results are changed by including two mobile factors if we assume
that the factors do not anticipate that the dierent factors move in opposite directions when
a local shock hits the economy (Monras (2013b) for more details). If we impose the amenities
to be valued equally by the various skill types, we force the economy to have equalized wage
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gaps across locations since asws = as′ws′ implies ws/ws′ = as′/as = rs/rs′ , which in turn
implies ws/rs = ws′/rs′ .
1.3.2 Gravity equation and internal migration
In the simple model, workers residing in location s do not have stronger preferences for
potential destination s′ that is closer to s than alternative destination s′′, with all else being
equal. This is an unrealistic assumption, primarily because internal migration rates follow
gravity type equations quite closely (Wozniak, 2010).
It is easy to incorporate distance in the model. For that we can specify the indirect utility
function as follows:
lnV is,s′ = lnVs,s′ + ε
i
s,s′ = lnAs′ + lnws′ − ln(ds,s′) + εis,s′ (1.19)
where ds,s′ indicates the distance between locations s and s′. This could be physical
distance or any other measure that indicates certain bilateral relations between the two
regions. Note that this could also represent a xed cost of migration: by assuming that the
distance is given by ds,s′ = C if s 6= s′ and ds,s = 1. Similarly, a model with xed costs and
distance is simply ds,s′ = Cd̃s,s′ .
Proposition 11. The relocation responses of workers to local shocks are asymptotically
identical when workers have moving cost.




























j,k . So, none of the elasticities computed
in lemma 2 change.









Proposition 12. Wages net of per capita amenities are no longer equalized across space.







In words, less central locations need to compensate for their `bad geography' by higher wages
or higher amenities per capita.
Note that local shocks do not aect Ds very much (especially if there are a large number
of possible locations). This means that ignoring the role of distance does not have important
consequences for the dynamics of the model. Instead, it is important when predicting where
labor is going to ow when there is a local economic shock.
1.3.3 Unemployment
Obviously regions dier not only in terms of the wages they oer but also in terms of their
unemployment levels. It is easy to introduce a search and match model of the local labor
market into the simple model presented before. In fact many of the results are unchanged
and just extended to unemployment rates. In what follows I introduce these changes.
21
Indirect Utility
Unemployment rates in region s′ are taken into account when valuing the various regions:
vis′ = lnVs′ + ε
i
s,s′ = lnAs′ + ln((1− us′) ∗ ωs′ + us′ ∗ bs′) + εis,s′
where us′ , bs′ and ωs′ are the unemployment rate, unemployment benets and wages in
region s′, respectively. The intuition is straightforward. If an individual i moves to s′, the
probability that she will be unemployed is us′ . She will then receive the unemployment
benet bs′ . Meanwhile, the probability that she will be employed and receive the wage ωs′
is 1− us′ .
This expression can be simplied even further if the unemployment benets are propor-
tional to wages. For instance, if bs′ = τs′ws′ then we have
vis′ = lnAs′ + ln((1− us′) ∗ ωs′ + us′ ∗ τωs′) + εis,s′ ≈ lnAs′ + lnωs′ − us′(1− τs′) + εis,s′
This expression has a simple interpretation. Indirect utility is higher if amenities are
higher, (ln) wages are higher and unemployment rates are lower  the more this is the case,
the lower unemployment benets are.
Labor market
Instead of being a competitive labor market, we can assume that there is search and match-
ing.
Assumption 13. In each local labor market s there are unemployed workers looking for
vacancies according to a matching technology.
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s , uc is the unemployment rate, vc is the vacancy
rate.
2. Probability of job loss: δ







4. Cost ow per vacancy: rsf
5. Unemployment benets: bs
These assumptions imply the following 3 extra (short-run) equilibrium conditions:
Beveridge curve
The fact that in equilibrium, unemployment growth is 0 implies:






where θc = vc/uc is the labor market tightness.
Job creation
The zero prot condition determines the job creation equation:






Nash bargaining between rms and workers (with weight β) implies:
wc = (1− β)bc + βrc(1 + fθc) (1.24)
These 3 equations determine {uc, θc, wc} in each local labor market.
Proposition 14. All the previous results hold. In particular, the elasticity of internal mi-
gration is relative to the relevant wage ws′ = (1− us′) ∗ ωs′ + us′ ∗ bs′ rather than simply the
market wage ωs′. It is useful to note that:
∂ws′
∂ωs′




























1.3.4 Forward looking agents, without savings
In this section I introduce how it is possible to extend the model to incorporate forward
looking agents in a simple model.
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subject to cisk ≤ ω
i
sk
. Note that there is no savings technology.
So, individual i living in state st at time t and choosing to move to st+1 consumes cist+1
from their wage ωist+1 . Unlike in the main model, individuals take into account of the future
at a discounted rate β. In the limiting case of β = 0 we are back to the model in the paper.
We can re-write this problem using Bellman equations in the indirect utility:
ln vi(st) = ln(Astwst) + βEt{argmaxst+1{ln v
i(st+1)}}+ εist−1,st (1.26)
This equation simply states that the value for someone moving to st ∈ {1, .., S} is the
value of the amenities and the wage they get at st.
Again, under suitable assumptions for the error term (i.e. extreme value distributed) we
can simplify this expression using the following:
Et{max
st+1





So we obtain the simplied expression:










1/λ that summarizes the value of each location in the future.





























Note that this is the same equation we had before. Thus,
Proposition 16. None of the results change if we have (perfectly) forward looking agents.
1.3.5 Housing Sector and other congestion or agglomeration forces
The only change we need to introduce is a housing sector:
vis′ = lnVs′ + ε
i
s,s′ = lnAs′ + lnws′ + lnGs′ − lnCs′ + εis,s′
lnGs′ indicates agglomeration forces while  lnCs′ indicates congestion forces. One
such congestion force is the local price of housing, which, in turn, is a consequence of the
local housing supply and local housing demand. To model it, we can just substitute Cs′ = phs′
where ps′ indicates the price of housing. All the previous analysis stays unchanged with the
addition of a housing sector.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model that can explain various stylized facts documented in
recent literature on internal migration. First, it shows how the fact that in-migration rates
can respond completely dierently from out-migration rates. This emerges quite naturally
from a dynamic discrete choice model of location choice in a multiple location setup where
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workers decide whether to move and where to move to. Thus, when a location is hit by
a negative shock, it is possible to explain how no one is attracted to the location anymore
rather than seeing workers escaping from it. For this result, it is crucial that gross ows
of workers are greater than net ows. This implies that there are two margins that can be
adjusted  in- and out-migration rates  and that need not respond equally.
As a result of this internal relocation adjustment, local shocks spill over to the rest of
the economy if the local labor demand is downward sloping. This means that through the
internal relocation of labor, local economies are insured against idiosyncratic shocks, which
are, in the long run, absorbed nationally. This theoretical result is quite general. The paper
shows that it is robust to the inclusion of various types of labor, imperfections in the labor
market, internal geography, forward looking agents and a housing sector.
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Chapter 2
Immigration and Wage Dynamics:
Evidence from the Mexican Peso Crisis
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2.1 Introduction
Despite the large inows of immigrants into many OECD countries in the last 20 or 30
years, there is no consensus on the causal impact of immigration on labor market outcomes.
Two reasons stand out. First, immigrants decide both where and when to migrate given
the economic conditions in the source and host countries. Second, natives may respond by
exiting or reducing inows to the locations receiving these immigrants. The combination of
these two endogenous decisions makes it hard to estimate the causal eect of immigration
on native labor market outcomes.
Various strategies have been employed to understand the consequences of immigration
on the labor market. Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001) compare labor market
outcomes or changes in labor market outcomes in response to local immigrant inows across
locations. To account for the endogenous sorting of migrants across locations they use what
has become known as the immigration networks instrument  past stocks of immigrants in
particular locations are good predictors of future ows. They nd only limited eects of
immigration on labor market outcomes in the cross-section or in ten-year rst dierences: a
1 percent higher share of immigrants is associated with a 0.1-0.2 percent wage decline.1 Also
doing an across-location comparison, Card (1990) reports that the large inow of Cubans
to Miami in 1980 (during the Mariel Boatlift) had a very limited eect on the Miami labor
market when compared to four other unaected metropolitan areas.2
In contrast to Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001), Borjas et al. (1997) argue that
local labor markets are suciently well connected in the US that estimates of the eect of
1Altonji and Card (1991) estimates using rst dierences between 1970 and 1980 and instruments result
in a signicantly higher eect. The same exercise, using other decades, delivers lower estimates, see Table
2.11 in this paper using dierences between 1990 and 2000 and the same instrument Altonji and Card (1991)
used.
2I discuss in detail the similarities and dierences of this paper with Card (1990) in Section 3.8 and I
provide a longer discussion in the Appendix.
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immigration on wages using spatial variation are likely to be downward-biased because work-
ers relocate across space. Instead, Borjas (2003) suggests comparing labor market outcomes
across education and experience groups, abstracting from geographic considerations. Using
this methodology with US decennial Census data between 1960 and 1990, he reports signif-
icantly larger eects of immigration on wages. A 1 percent immigration-induced increase in
the labor supply in an education-experience cell is associated with a 0.3-0.4 percent decrease
in wages on average. This has been the main controversy in the immigration debate: whether
we should look at local labor markets or should instead focus on the national market.
This paper builds on this previous literature to better understand the eects of immi-
grants on labor market outcomes, by using the exogenous push factor of the Mexican Peso
Crisis of 1995 in conjunction with the migration network instrument as my identication
strategy. I show that the eect of immigration is large on impact for competing native work-
ers  dened by skill and location groups  and that it quickly dissipates across space. My
ndings emphasize that in order to evaluate the labor market impacts of immigration it is
crucial to think about time horizons and the dynamics of adjustment. These results help to
reconcile previous ndings in the literature.
In December 1994, the government led by Ernesto Zedillo allowed greater exibility of
the peso vis Ã vis the dollar. This resulted in an attack on the peso that caused Mexico
to abandon the peg. It was followed by an unanticipated economic crisis known as the the
Peso Crisis or the Mexican Tequila Crisis (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). Mexican GDP
growth fell 11 percentage points, from a positive 6 percent in 1994 to a negative 5 percent
in 1995. This occurred while US GDP maintained a fairly constant growth rate of around 5
percent.
This deep recession prompted many Mexicans to emigrate to the US. Precise estimates
on net Mexican immigration are hard to obtain (see Passel (2005), Passel et al. (2012) or
Hanson (2006)). Many Mexicans enter to the US illegally, sometimes escaping the count of
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US statistical agencies. However, as I show in detail in Section 2, all sources agree that 1995
was a high-immigration year.3 As a result of the Mexican crisis, migration ows to the US
were probably 50 percent higher, with around 200,000 more Mexicans immigrating in 1995
than in a typical year of the 1990s. This increase in the net Mexican inows was a result
of both more low-skilled  particularly young  Mexicans migrating to the US and fewer
low skilled Mexicans returning to Mexico. I can thus use geographic, skill and labor market
experience variation to see if workers more closely competing with these net Mexican inows
suered more from the shock.4
Some concerns, however, remain. In the rst place, in order to estimate the possible
consequences of immigrants on native wages we need to know with whom Mexican workers,
who are usually high school drop-outs, compete. Two elasticities of substitution are key
to answer this: rst, are natives and immigrants imperfect substitutes as suggested in Card
(2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012)? And, second, are high school drop-outs and graduates
imperfect substitutes as in Borjas (2003)? Importantly, the answer to these questions denes
the pool of workers that absorbs new immigrant shocks.5 In this paper I directly compare
the labor market fortunes of natives and Hispanics or high school drop-outs and graduates
in the years after the unexpectedly large Mexican inow and show that they are all close
substitutes.
A second concern is that, despite my eorts to combine all the data sources available,
there is still some measurement error in the estimates of Mexican inows. This could bias my
3Using data from the 2000 US Census, from the US Department of Homeland Security (documented
immigrants), estimates of undocumented immigrants from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
as reported in Hanson (2006), estimates from Passel et al. (2012) and apprehensions data from the INS we
see an unusual spike in the inow of immigrants in 1995. I will discuss the numbers of immigration arrivals
later in this paper.
4A similar instrumental strategy based on push factors and previous settlement patterns is used in Boustan
(2010) study of the Black Migration.
5See Card (2009), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Aydemir and Borjas (2011), Dustmann and Preston (2012),
Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007)
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estimates. To address it I use another natural experiment: the displacement of workers due to
Hurricane Katrina.6 In contrast to the case of undocumented low-skilled Mexican workers, it
is unlikely that those displaced by Katrina are undercounted by statistical agencies. I obtain
similar results for the eect of the Katrina migrants as for Mexican migrants, suggesting
that mismeasurement of Mexican inows is not severely biasing my estimates.
In this paper, I show that a 1 percent immigration-induced labor supply shock reduces
low-skilled wages by around 1-1.5 percent in the two years following the shock. Soon after,
wages return to their pre-shock trends. This is due to signicant reallocation across states.
While in the rst year the immigration shock increases the share of low-skilled workers almost
one to one in high-immigration states, in around two years it goes back to trend.7 This is the
case partly because fewer young native low-skilled workers move to high-immigration states.
A 1 percent labor supply shock reduces the share of workers that moved to the aected
locations from the rest of the nation by around .2 percentage points. This helps to understand
why, while the eect on wages is large on impact, it quickly dissipates across states. By 1999,
the fth year after the shock, wages of low-skilled workers in high-immigration states are only
slightly lower than they were before the shock, relative to low-immigration states. Thus the
US labor market for low-skilled workers adjusts to unexpected supply shocks quite rapidly.
Given that there are spillovers across states, I cannot use the natural experiment to inves-
tigate the longer-run eects of immigration on labor market outcomes. I take two avenues to
try to shed some light on these longer-run eects. First, I show that, when abstracting from
6In this case I can also use an adapted version of the immigration network instrument. Past stocks of
workers from Louisiana and Mississippi  the two states that suered the hurricane  are a good predictor
of where displaced workers from Katrina moved. The identication strategy will thus interact this with the
shock period, 2005 and 2006.
7Over the 1990s the share of low skilled workers in high immigration states increased with immigration
(Card et al., 2008). The reallocation documented in this paper explains how unexpected labor supply shocks
are absorbed into the national economy. Changes in the factor mix absent unexpectedly large immigration-
induced shocks can be explained trough technology adoption in Lewis (2012).
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locations, the wage change between 1990 and 2000 for workers who entered the labor market
in particularly high-immigration years during the 1990s is lower than for those who entered
in lower immigration years, in line with what Oreopoulos et al. (Forthcoming) document for
college graduates who enter the labor market in bad economic years. This is in the spirit of
Borjas (2003) regressions but using the Peso Crisis as a factor generating exogenous varia-
tion in immigration inows. Second, I introduce a spatial equilibrium model and calibrate
it to US data to simulate the evolution of wages at the local level had the Peso Crisis not
occurred. The model also allows me to interpret my reduced form estimates as structural
parameters. Its two key parameters are the local labor demand elasticity and the internal
migration sensitivity of native workers to local conditions. These, in turn, determine how
much labor supply shocks are felt in wages and how fast these local shocks spread to the rest
of the economy. In short, it helps to determine how long the long run is.
This paper contributes to two important literatures. First, it contributes to the under-
standing of the eects of low-skilled immigration in the US. Following the pioneering work
by Card (1990) and Altonji and Card (1991), I use variation across local labor markets to
estimate the eect of immigration. I extend their work by combining Card's immigration
network instrument with the Mexican Peso Crisis as a novel exogenous push factor that
brought more Mexicans than expected to many  and not just one as in Card (1990)  US
local labor markets. This unexpectedly large inow allows me to understand the timing
and sequence of events in response to an immigration shock. When more immigrants enter
specic local labor markets, wages decrease more than what is suggested in either Card
(2001) or Borjas (2003). This prompts net interstate labor relocation that leads the shock
to dissipate across space. This explains why in the longer-run, as I document, the eect
of immigration on wages is small across local labor markets but larger across age cohorts
(Borjas, 2003). This paper adds to Borjas (2003) longer-run results an instrumental variable
strategy based on the age distribution of the unexpected inow of Mexican workers resulting
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from the Mexican Peso Crisis.
Second, it contributes to the spatial labor economics literature. A number of recent papers
look at the eects of negative shocks to the local labor demand using various strategies (see
Autor et al. (Forthcoming), Autor et al. (2013b), Autor et al. (2013a), Beaudry et al. (2010),
Hornbeck (2012), Hornbeck and Naidu (2012), Notowidigdo (2013), Diamond (2013)). In line
with most spatial models (see Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Glaeser (2008)), they report
how aected locations lose population after the shock. This labor reallocation becomes a
labor supply shock to locations not directly aected. Thus, knowing how local labor markets
respond to labor supply shocks helps in understanding how local labor demand shocks spread
to the larger national labor market, an important and sometimes neglected aspect in these
studies.
2.2 Historical background and data
2.2.1 A brief history of Mexican immigration
One of the most striking changes to US demographics in the last 20 years of the twentieth
century is the large inux of immigrants from around the globe. Among those, an important
fraction came from Mexico and were low-skilled (see Borjas and Katz (2007) or Passel et
al. (2012)). In fact, the rst wave of Mexican immigration started in the 1910s and ended
with World War II. This brought almost one million Mexicans to the US who settled in
neighboring US states, primarily Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and California (see Jiménez
(2010) and Borjas and Katz (2007)). These early settlements established the basis for the
formation of immigration networks that subsequently helped in posterior migration (Munshi,
2003).
After World War II migration started to decline, reaching its lowest levels (both in abso-
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lute terms and relative to US population) by the early 1970s. This dramatically changed in
the 1980s. Mexican immigrant stocks increased to around two million in the early 1980s, to
almost four million in the early 1990s and to around eight million in 2000. This makes the
1990s the highest immigration decade. Mexican immigration seems to have slowed in the
beginning of the twenty rst century, but it remains a controversial political topic, as can
be seen in the immigration reforms that started in 2013 and the role it plays in every US
presidential campaign.
2.2.2 Mexican Inows in the 1990s
As reported in Borjas and Katz (2007), in 1990 the great majority of Mexicans were in
California (57.5 percent), while the largest increases during the decade of the 1990s in the
share of Mexicans in the state's labor force were in Arizona, Colorado, California, New
Mexico and Texas. Within the 1990s, however, there was important variation in the number
of Mexicans entering each year. There are a number of alternatives with which to try to
obtain estimates on yearly ows between Mexico and the US. A rst set of alternatives is to
use various data sources to obtain a direct estimate of the Mexican (net) inows. A second
set of alternatives is to look at indirect data, like apprehensions at the US-Mexican border.
I present these in what follows.
Direct measures of Mexican inows
Perhaps the rst natural source is the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from Ruggles
et al. (2008). Unfortunately, the CPS only started to report birthplaces in 1994. Moreover,
there are some concerns that the survey may have underestimated the unexpected inow
of Mexicans into the US in 1995. Despite these concerns, Figure 2.1 clearly shows that a
signicant number of Mexicans entered the US labor force in 1995. It is dicult to believe,
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given the net inows of Mexicans during the 1990s suggested in the various sources that
I will discuss in detail below, that the share of Mexicans in the low-skilled US workforce
decreased in 1996.8
Figure 2.1: Share of Mexicans in the US low-skilled labor force, CPS data
Notes: This gure plots the share of Mexicans among low-skilled workers in each year of the 1990s where
CPS data is available. According to these data there was a labor supply shock in 1995 just less than 1
percent. Other data sets suggest that the shock might have been slightly larger.
There are a number of ways to try to obtain better estimates than by exclusively using
the CPS. To some extent they all rely on the question in the Census 2000: When did this
person come to live in the United States? (Ruggles et al., 2008). This yields an estimate
of the number of Mexicans still residing in the US in 2000 who arrived in each year of the
1990s. Figure 2.2 shows these estimates.
The Census 2000 data in Figure 2.2 also document a spike in 1995. We observe an
upward trend, partly the result of migrants who returned to Mexico or who died. How
8Throughout the paper I dene low-skilled workers as high school drop-outs and high school graduates.
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Figure 2.2: Mexicans in the US in 2000, by year of arrival
Notes: This gure plots the number of Mexicans that were in the US in 2000 by their reported year of
arrival in the US. Note that the number of Mexicans who reported 1995 as their arrival year is around 50
percent higher than those who reported 1994 or 1996.
we account for this distinguishes the dierent estimates on annual inows available in the
literature. Passel et al. (2012) estimates are the standard source. For these estimates, they
rst compute aggregate net inows over the 1990s by comparing stocks of Mexicans in 1990
and 2000 using US Census data. The net inows over the 1990s is estimated at about 4-5
million and this needs to be matched by any estimates of yearly inows.9 To obtain the
yearly inows they use the US census question on year of arrival. Passel et al. (2012) adjust
these estimates for undercount using information from the CPS and further inate by 0.5
9In the 2000 US Census, more Mexicans said that they arrived in the US in 1990 than the actual estimate
in the 1990 US census. This suggests that undercount is an important issue or at least was in 1990. Hanson
(2006) discusses the literature on counting undocumented migrants. There is some open debate on the size
of undercount in 1990, but there is a wider consensus that the undercount is minimal in the 2000 US Census.
Depending on the sources this implies a range of possible estimates of Mexican net inows over the 1990s of
between 4 and 5 million.
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percent for each year before 2000 to account for mortality and emigration between arrival
and 2000. Finally they match decade net inows estimated using the 1990 and 2000 Censuses
by further inating the annual inows by almost 9 percent. A summary of these numbers
and of the Mexican counts of the US Censuses of 1990 and 2000 is provided in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Mexican Stocks and Inows
Variable Source Number year
Mexican Stock US Cen. 2000 4,274,710 1990
Mexican Stock US Cen. 1990 3,699,873 1990
Mexican Stock US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 6,140,924 1995
(=5,909,696+231,228)
Mexican Stock US Cen. 2000 7,970,009 2000
Average Inow 1990-2000 (workers) US Cen. 2000 369,529.9 1990-95
Average Inow 1990-1995 (workers) US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 373,242.8 1990-95
Average Inow 1995-2000 (workers) US Cen. 2000 + Mex. Cen. 365,817 1995-00
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 400,000 1992
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 370,000 1993
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 430,000 1994
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 570,000 1995
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 490,000 1996
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 470,000 1997
Mexican Inow (total) Passel et al. (2012) 600,000 1998
Notes: This table reports the stocks and inows of Mexicans in the US in dierent years. Sources of the
estimates are also reported. Data from Censuses comes from Ruggles et al. (2008). Further details are
provided in the text.
There are two concerns with Passel et al. (2012) estimates that I address. First, Passel
et al. (2012) do not take into account the possibility that fewer Mexicans residing in the US
returned to Mexico in particular years. Second, they do not account for the possibility that
the observed spike in 1995 is just a result of the fact that 1995 is a multiple of 5 and thus,
more commonly reported by respondents to US Census questioning, as suggested in Card
and Lewis (2007). I try to address these two concerns by combining several data sources to
propose an improved account of net yearly Mexican inows.
To account for the possibility that fewer Mexicans than expected returned to the US
when the crisis hit Mexico I use data from the Mexican Migration Project. The Mexican
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Migration Project is a survey intended research about the migration behavior of Mexicans.
The survey is conducted both in Mexico and in the US and it is possible to use these data
to construct the year of return of Mexicans that spent some time in the US during the 1990s
and that were living in Mexico in the 2000s. The top panel of Figure 2.3 shows the share of
these Mexicans by year of return. It clearly shows that fewer of them returned right after
the Peso crisis hit. The upward trend is probably due to mortality and to the fact that there
were fewer Mexicans in the US in the early 1990s (and thus fewer Mexicans returned to
Mexico in the early 1990s than in the late 1990s simply because there were a smaller number
of them in the US).
Figure 2.3: Yearly Mexican inows and outows measures
Note: The top panel shows the share of Mexicans residing in Mexico in the 2000s that claim to have
returned to Mexico in the 1990s, by year of return. The lower panel shows the share of Mexicans residing
in the US in each year of the 1990s, relative to immigrants from other destinations, using 2000 US Census
information on the year of arrival of each individual. Taken together this evidence suggests that fewer
Mexicans left the US and more entered as a consequence of the Mexican Peso Crisis.
To obtain a measure of migration from Mexico, I use the question on year of arrival in
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the US in the 2000 US Census. Unlike Passel et al. (2012), to avoid concerns on articial
spikes in years that are multiples of ve (Card and Lewis, 2007), I compute the number
of Mexicans residing in the US each year relative to the number of low-skilled immigrants
from the rest of the world using the aforementioned question in the 2000 US Census. This
can be seen in the bottom panel in Figure 2.3. The upward trend in this gure is probably
explained by the higher return rate of Mexican immigrants relative to immigrants of other
nationalities.
In order to measure the actual net number of Mexicans migrating each year I do the
following. I rst de-trend the series of computed emigration and immigration from Mexico
and in-migration presented in gure 2.3. I then use the percentage deviation from trend of
these series to match the aggregate migration in the decade measured using the US Censuses
in 1990 and 2000, following Passel et al. (2012). The gross numbers resulting from this
exercise are summarized by Figure 2.4.10
In sum, the two graphs in Figure 2.3 show that more Mexicans moved to the US in
1995 and fewer returned to Mexico in 1995-1997. This increased the supply of low-skilled
workers in particular states in the US, especially California. It is also reassuring that other
data sources, like the number of legal Mexican migrants recorded by the Department of
Homeland Security or the number of undocumented migrants computed using Immigration
Naturalization Service data (Hanson, 2006) also see a spike right after the Peso Crisis.
While all my qualitative results are robust to using any of the above measures, since the
main source of identication comes from the unexpected large net inow of 1995, measures
underestimating the increase in net inows will overestimate the eects of immigrants. I later
10In the Appendix I explain all the steps in more detail. The largest dierence between my estimates and
Passel et al. (2012) are 1998 and 1999. For instance, (Passel et al., 2012) reports that the net number of
Mexican immigrants in 1999 was 700,000, while my estimates decrease this number to around 400,000. It is
dicult to know with certainty which estimates are more accurate for these years. However, the fact that
in the US census of 2000 350,000 answered that they moved to the US in 1999 suggests that my estimates
might be more accurate than Passel et al. (2012) at least for 1999.
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Figure 2.4: Net Mexican inows into the US, by year
Notes: This gure shows the estimated net inow of Mexicans by (Passel et al., 2012) and my own
estimates using data from the US Census 2000 and the Mexican Migration Project.
discuss this concern in more detail; I address it by using the Katrina shock as an alternative
natural experiment that unexpectedly brought more low-skilled workers to some US states.
To obtain a measure of the Mexican ows to each state at each point in time I rst
predict the place of arrival by the immigrant geographic distribution in 199011 and then, I
assign the aggregate inows accordingly. This is the measure that I use for the number of
Mexicans arriving in state s at time t. It is worth noting that the measure I obtain and the
one Passel et al. (2012) obtain are almost identical at the state level: the correlation between
both is .98. This reects the concentration of Mexicans in certain states.
11Using the distribution in 2000 yields very similar results.
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Indirect measures of Mexican inows
As mentioned before, we can also look at more indirect measures of Mexican inows. A
rst such measure is the marked increase in coyote prices starting in 1995  the price of
the smuggler who facilitates migration across the Mexican-US border, see Hanson (2006).
This may be in part due to increased border enforcement, but it also probably reects an
increased willingness to emigrate from Mexico. In fact, the US border enforcement launched
two operations in the early 1990s to try to curb the number of immigrants entering the
US. Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper  launched in El Paso, TX and San
Diego, CA respectively  had dierent degrees of success (Martin, 1995). Operation Hold the
Line managed to curb Mexican immigrants, while Operation Gatekeeper was less successful.
To some extent, however, these operations redirected the routes Mexicans took to get to the
US. There is some evidence suggesting that some of the Mexicans who would have otherwise
entered through El Paso, TX did so through Nogales, AZ. In any case, the coyote prices
only started to increase in 1995 and not when these operations were launched, suggesting
that more people wanted to enter the US in 1995, right when the Peso Crisis hit Mexico, and
that the increased coyote prices were not just a result of the increased border enforcement
of the early 1990s.
Another piece of evidence suggesting higher inows in 1995 is the evolution of the number
of apprehensions over the 1990s (data from Gordon Hanson's website, see Hanson (2006) or
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)). Figure 2.5 shows the (log) monthly adjusted apprehensions.
The spike in September 1993 coincides with the launching of Operation Hold the Line in El
Paso, TX. At the beginning of 1995 there is a clear increase in the number of apprehensions
that lasts at least until late 1996. This seems to coincide with the evolution of US low-skilled
workers' wages, as I will discuss in detail in what follows. Arizona and California saw much
steeper declines in low-skilled wages in 1995 than Texas, something that seems consistent
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with the greater success of Operation Hold the Line.
Figure 2.5: Annual Mexican apprehensions in the US-Mexican border
Note: This gure shows the (log) monthly apprehensions of Mexicans at the US-Mexican border. Month
xed eects are removed from the graph. Apprehensions data is highly cyclical, with most apprehensions
occurring in the rst few months of each year and less at the end of the year. Removing the month xed
eects helps visualize the longer run movements. Source: Hanson (2006).
2.2.3 Immigrant Age Distribution
All this evidence demonstrates both that more Mexicans entered the US and that fewer
Mexicans already living in the US returned home in 1995. These Mexicans were probably
mostly low-skilled (see Borjas and Katz (2007)), and they also diered (with respect to US
natives) in their labor market experience. In this section I show how those new entrants
were substantially younger.
Mexican immigrants tend to be young and compete with younger workers when they
arrive in the US (see also Smith (2012)). The US Census of 2000 allows me to build the age
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distribution of the immigrants at the time of their arrival (at least of the Mexicans still in
the US in 2000). To do so, I use information on the year of arrival and age in 2000. Figure
2.6 shows that most Mexican immigrants are indeed quite young when migrating to the US:
around 80 percent of them are between 18 and 35 years old. As can be seen in the right
panel of Figure 2.6, this is quite stable across years and it did not change in 1995 or 1996.
Figure 2.6: Age Distribution of Mexican Immigrants
Notes: The left hand side graph shows the average age of all Mexicans in the US in 2000 in the year of
arrival to the US. The right hand side graph shows the age in 2000 of Mexicans in the US in 2000 in three
selected years of arrival, 1994-1996. Around 90 percent of Mexicans are younger than 35 years old when
arriving in the US and more Mexicans than usual immigrated to the US in 1995.
However, Mexican Migration Project data shows that Mexicans that returned to Mexico
in the 1990s were more evenly distributed across age groups, as can be seen in Figure
2.7. Note that in this case the distribution is noisier because it is constructed using fewer
observations than the ones in the 2000 US Census.
The information contained in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 suggests that although all low-skilled
natives suered a labor supply shock in 1995, this was disproportionately so for younger
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Figure 2.7: Age Distribution of Returning Mexican Immigrants
Notes: This gure shows the age distribution of Mexicans that were living in the US in the 1990s and that
returned to Mexico.
workers. This, as I show later on, matters for labor market outcomes and internal migration
rates, as younger US native workers are seen to be more aected than older workers in 1995
in high-immigration states.
2.2.4 Geographic disaggregation
The geographic units that I use in this paper are, as should be clear at this point, US
states. There is some discussion in the literature as to what is the appropriate geographic
disaggregation to represent a local labor market. Card (2009) argues that metropolitan areas
probably provide the appropriate level of analysis. When using Census data there are many
metropolitan areas with many individual level observations. This is dierent with CPS data.
As an example, there are only 11 metropolitan areas in the March CPS data for 1995 that
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have more than 500 individual level observations. Another drawback of using metropolitan
areas is that we would lose nearly 24,000 individual observations that lack metropolitan area
information. This is a lot of information given the sample size in the CPS.
This suggests using a partition of the US territory, an observation also made in Autor and
Dorn (2009). They use commuting zones (CZ), which are constructed based on commuting
patterns from the 1990 US Census based on the work by Tolbert and Sizer (1996). This
results in 722 dierent CZs that cover the entire US. The number of commuting zones,
however, is too large for the CPS data. The CPS data has around 150,000 observations per
year.12 This means that if I were to use all the CZs I would only have around 70 observations
per CZ on average. Moreover, since I distinguish between high- and low-skilled workers I
would end up with geographic units of around 35 observations. Given the variance in wages
in the US, this is not a feasible geographic unit. This leaves me with states as natural
candidates for a geographic disaggregation, which I use throughout the paper.
2.2.5 Labor Market Outcome Variables
I use CPS data to compute three measures of wage: the weekly individual wage, the weekly
average wage at the state level and the composition adjusted weekly wage in a state. All
wages are in real 1999 dollars. The weekly wage is constructed from the yearly wage and the
number of weeks worked in a year for every individual in the CPS sample.13
From individual-level information on wages I construct the two aggregate measures of
12This number includes all individuals irrespective of age. Around 60,000 observations can be used to
compute wages.
13The CPS also provides the real hourly wage. This is the reported hourly wage the week previous to the
week of the interview, in March of every year. I do not report results using this variable in the paper, but all
the results are unchanged when using this real hourly wage instead of the real weekly wage. I use the weekly
wage because there are more observations available. The wage and the number of weeks worked reported in
a given year refer to the previous year. Thus, I will use the answers in 1996 to know the wage in 1995. An
alternative to the March CPS data is the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group les. In the Appendix I
report estimates using these alternative data.
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the low-skilled wage for each state and each year. The rst, which is the one I use primarily,
is simply the average (log) wage of the full-time working population, excluding Hispanics
from the computation14. For the second, used mainly in the Appendix, I follow the literature
by running rst stage Mincerian regressions to control for compositional eects and I use
the state xed eects as this aggregate measure of wages. In particular I run the following
regression:15
lnwagei = Xi ∗ βt + δt,s + εi,∀t ∈ [1992, 1998]
where i ∈ IL indicates individuals in the set of low-skilled workers and s ∈ S indicates
US states. The subscript t indicates that I run each year in a separate regression. Low-
skilled workers are dened as high school drop outs and high school graduates. Xi are
the standard controls (Card, 1999): potential experience, experience squared, a dummy for
black, a dummy for females, a dummy for rural and a dummy for other races. I also include
a dummy for Hispanic origin. δt,s is a set of xed eects capturing the premium in dierent
states. By just using the xed eects this measure considers the wage of workers with no
experience evaluated at the omitted dummy variables, i.e., white metropolitan male workers.
When I evaluate the impact of Hurricane Katrina I use the very same variables, using
the American Community Survey (ACS) data instead of CPS. The main dierence between
14Ideally I would have preferred to exclude Mexicans or Mexicans and other foreign born people. As
mentioned before, this information is only available after 1994, limiting the pre-shock series. I preferred to
extend the pre-shock series at the cost of using the Hispanic origin variable to exclude former immigrants from
wage and reallocation computations. The results do not change if instead I limit the analysis to post-1994
and I explicitly use the birth place as the variable distinguishing immigrants and natives.
15I follow Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and I only consider full-time, full-year workers. They are dened
as workers who have worked at least 35 hours and 40 weeks a year and report a valid income wage. I
further drop self employed workers and workers above and bellow 65 or below 18 years old. I also correct
for top coding following the literature. Histograms of the raw data are available upon request; in particular
histograms of raw weekly wage, experience levels and age. See also Autor and Katz (1999) or Katz and
Murphy (1992).
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the two data sets is the sample size. While the CPS has around 150,000 observations per
year, the ACS has over 1 million individual observations before 2005 and over 3 million in
more recent years.
I also use the CPS and ACS data to compute other labor market outcome variables. In
particular I construct the unemployment share as the number of unemployed divided by the
working age population. I prefer this measure over the more conventional unemployed over
active labor market participants to limit the extent of the endogenous adjustment of labor
market participation to the labor supply shocks I am studying. It also helps to limit the
impact of the reforms of CPS questioning in 1994. The main results are not sensitive to this
choice. I also use information in the CPS to compute the school enrolment rate, i.e., the
number of individuals who report that they are attending a school divided by the population
between 18 and 25 years old.
Finally I use CPS data to count employment levels and reallocation. For employment
levels I simply compute the number of individuals who are in full time employment. For
reallocation, I compute the share of low-skilled individuals either including or excluding the
Hispanic workers to see its evolution in high- and low-immigration states. I also compute the
internal in-migration and out-migration rates by computing the share of workers in a given
location who report having lived in a dierent state in the previous year. I compute these
distinguishing skill levels and age groups, depending on the application. This distinguishes
the two possible mechanisms through which reallocation can take place: changes in the inow
to or the outow from particular states. Unfortunately this information is not available for




Table 2.2 shows the main variables used for the estimation of the causal eect of Mexican
inows on low-skilled native wages. They are divided into four blocks. The rst block
describes the various measures of net inows at the state level, both in absolute and relative
terms. While Mexican inows were negligible in many states, there are a few that received
large numbers of new workers every year. The largest inow is in California, which in 1995
received slightly more than 300,000 (potential) workers, which represents almost 9 percent
of the state's low-skilled labor force. This is around 50 percent higher than in a normal year
of the 1990s.
The second block describes labor market outcomes. Average wages of low-skilled workers
at the state level are signicantly lower than those of high-skilled workers. There is some
dispersion across states, as one would expect given the various shocks that hit the economy
and given the potentially dierent amenity levels in each state. Average wages do not dier
signicantly from the wages obtained from a rst stage Mincerian regression, as can also be
seen in this second block of summary statistics.
The third block provides some descriptive statistics on GDP and trade. It shows that
trade usually makes up a very small fraction of the state GDP. In the case of California, the
state receiving the largest amount of immigrants, the ratio of US exports to Mexico relative
to state GDP is below .7 percent throughout the decade. Other states like Texas, Michigan,
Arizona, Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina and Delaware have higher or very similar ratios
of exports to Mexico to GDP. In other words, Mexican immigration is substantially more
important for California than exports to Mexico.
The nal block provides some key variables for the exercise on Katrina. It shows how
labor inows from Louisiana and Mississippi are, in general, very low. The mean across US
states is less than .1 percent of the state population. The relatively high variance of this
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Mexican inows at state level
Mexican Inows (own estimates) 8,671.9 37,896.0 357
Mexican Inows (Passel et al. (2012) estimates) 9,327.7 40,375.7 357
Mexican Inows (INS+DHS) 7,215.3 31,555.8 357
Maximum number of Mexican Inows (in a state) 326,305.7
Relative Mexican Inows (own estimates) 0.005 0.012 357
Relative Mexican Inows (Passel et al. (2012) estimates) 0.006 0.013 357
Relative Mexican Inows (INS+DHS) 0.004 0.01 357
Maximum number of Relative Mexican Inows (in a state) 0.088
Share of Mexicans (1994 onwards) 0.03 0.056 255
Labor Market Outcomes
Average low-skilled wage 5.953 0.099 357
Average low-skilled wage (Mincerian regressions) 5.687 0.09 357
Average high-skilled wage 6.341 0.143 357
Unemployment rate 0.057 0.018 357
(log) state GDP 11.359 1.033 357
School Enrollment rate (25 years old) 0.415 0.067 357
GDP and exports
US GDP growth rate 0.056 0.006 7
Mexican GDP growth rate 0.045 0.041 7
State Exports (in millions) 1,079.3 3,828.7 357
State GDP (in millions) 288,375.1 349,363.9 357
Ratio Exports to GDP at state level 0.002 0.003 357
Various variables, Katrina
Relative Inow from LA and MS 0.001 0.002 441
Average low-skilled wage 5.836 0.095 441
Unemployment rate 0.074 0.021 441
Internal in-migration rate (low-skilled) 0.031 0.013 441
(log) state GDP 11.959 1.041 441
Notes: These are the main variables used in the analysis of the causal eect of immigration on wages. The
averages are unweighted, so do not necessarily coincide with the true US average. This data covers years
the 1992-1998 and 2003-2011.
variable reects the Katrina shock.
2.3 Short-run eects of immigration
In this section I investigate the short-run eects of immigration on labor market outcomes.
The usual empirical model to study these is to explain labor market variables of interest by
the inows of immigrant workers into these various labor markets relative to the local labor
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force (Borjas, 2003):
Yst = α + β ∗
Labor Inowst
Nst
+Xst ∗ γ + δt + δs + εst (2.1)
where Yst is our labor market outcome of interest, s are states or more generally regions,
t is time, Nst is the size of the local labor force, Xst are time-varying state controls, and δ
indicates the possible inclusion of xed eects.
The concern with these regressions is that Mexican workers might be deciding where
and when to migrate given the local labor market conditions of interest. We thus need
an instrument with which to learn about the causal eect of immigration on labor market
outcomes.
2.3.1 Instrument
As noted before in Figure 2.4 more Mexicans than usual moved to the US in 1995, while
fewer returned to Mexico in 1995-97. Similarly, more workers moved out from Louisiana or
Mississippi in 2005 and 2006. These will be the basis of the instrument. A simple way to
capture this shock is to instrument the relative net inows of Mexicans by the interaction of
the year of the shock dummies and the share of Mexicans in each state in 1980. Specically
I dene:





is simply the share of low-skilled Mexicans in each state in 1980 relative
to the size of the low-skilled labor market in 1980. I use year dummies instead of a post
shock dummy to account for the fact that the shock might have been of dierent intensity
in dierent years.
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My instruments are then Zst. The main specication uses only 1995 as the year of
the shock because I want to capture the very short-run eects. In the Appendix I show
that the results are robust to using a number of alternative instruments16. In all cases,
the identication comes from comparing states with themselves before and after the shock,
given that the size of the shock was dierent in dierent states due to the uneven settlement
pattern of the early immigrants.
When using Hurricane Katrina as the push factor I substitute the years 2005 and 2006
for the year 1995 and the stock of people from Louisiana and Mississippi in 2000, computed
using Census 2000 data, for the stock of Mexicans in 1980. Thus, my instrument for Katrina
is the interaction of the year dummies for the shock period with the past outows from
Louisiana and Mississippi.
2.3.2 Exclusion Restriction
In any instrumental strategy one of the biggest concerns is that the exclusion restriction is
violated. In this context it is possible that the Mexican crisis aected not only immigration
but also US-Mexican trade relations.
More specically, the devaluation of the Peso might have increased exports from Mexico
to the US, relative to the trend. Figure 2.8 suggests that this was not the case. It also shows
that exports from the US to Mexico in fact saw a signicant decrease. If states exporting to
Mexico are the same states where Mexican immigrants enter, then I might be confounding
the eect of trade and immigration. Fortunately, even if there is some overlap, immigrants do
not systematically enter states that export heavily to Mexico. The unconditional correlation
between the relative immigration ows and the share of exports to Mexico (relative to state
16I can use only the interaction of 1995 and the share of Mexicans in 1980, or the interaction of this share
with year dummies for the period 1995 to 1997, the interaction of a dummy for the shock period and this
share of Mexican or even the interaction of a post shock dummy and the share of Mexicans in 1980. All
these alternatives are shown in the Appendix.
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GDP) is below .5. Similarly, in an OLS regression with state and time xed eects the
covariance between these two variables is indistinguishable from 0.
Figure 2.8: US trade
Note: Exports US-Mex are exports from the US to Mexico divided by US GDP. Imports US-Mex are
imports to the US from Mexico divided by US GDP. Total US exports are exports from the US to the rest
of the world divided by US GDP. Mexican exports to the US did not increase above trend in 1995, while
US exports to Mexico decreased in 1995, potentially aecting labor market outcomes. At the same time US
exports to the rest of the world were slightly above trend in 1995. Source: Census Bureau
(http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html)
Furthermore, even if exports to Mexico and immigration from Mexico occur in the same
states, it is harder to explain through trade why the negative eect is mainly concentrated
on workers with similar characteristics to the Mexican inows. I document the largest labor
market impacts on young low-skilled workers in high-immigration states, some eects on
older low-skilled workers and no eects on high-skilled workers, which matches the nature of
the immigration shock.
To avoid the possible contamination of my estimates from the direct eect of trade on
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wages I include in some of my regressions (log) US states' exports to Mexico and (log) state
GDP. This should control for the possible direct eect of trade on the US labor market17.
2.3.3 Short-run eects of immigration on wages
In this section I estimate the causal eect of immigration on US local wages. I use the
following equation for estimation:
lnwst = α + β ∗
Labor Inowst
Nst
+Xst ∗ γ + δt + δs + εst (2.2)
where, Labor Inow ∈ {Mexst, Katst} is the ow of low-skilled Mexican or Katrina
workers into state s at time t, while Nst is the population of native low-skilled workers.
Xst is a vector of controls that includes the total population of low-skilled workers in a
given state, the output of the state and its exports to Mexico. I also include state-specic
time trends and state xed eects. The total number of observations is 357: 50+1 states
times 7 years [1992-1998] when using the Mexican shock. When using Katrina I have 441
observations: 49 states (all except for Louisiana and Mississippi) and 9 years of data.
A simple graphical representation shows the estimates I later report. Figure 2.9 shows
the evolution of the average low and high-skilled wages in California and the evolution of
low-skilled wages in a lower immigration state like New York. Wages are normalized to 1
in 1994 to make the comparisons simpler. A few things are worth noting from Figure 2.9.
First, low-skilled wages decreased in 1993. In some states, unlike California, high-skilled
wages also decreased in that year. This is probably a result of the economic downturn in
1992. Second, when comparing low and high-skilled wages in California we see that low-
17Data for state exports to Mexico is provided by WISERTrade (www.wisertrade.org), based on the US
Census Bureau. Exports are computed using state of origin. state of origin is not dened as the state
of manufacture, but rather as the state where the product began its journey to the port of export. It can
also be the state of consolidation of shipments. Though imperfect, this is the best data available, to my
knowledge, on international exports from US states.
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skilled wages clearly decreased in 1995 and 1996 and then recovered their pre-shock trend,
while, if anything, high-skilled wages increased slightly in 1995. By the end of the decade
high-skilled wages increased in California, probably showing the beginning of the dot com
bubble. When instead we compare low-skilled wages in California and New York, we observe
that the decrease in California is more pronounced than that of New York, where Mexican
immigration was a lot less important.
Figure 2.9: Evolution of wages, raw data
Note: This gure reports the low-skilled average wage in California and New York and the high-skilled
average wage in California. California is the highest immigration state, while New York is a good
comparison state because it is comparable in economic terms but has lower levels of Mexican immigrants.
The estimation exercise shows that the pattern I describe in Figure 2.9 is general. I could
estimate equation 2.2 using OLS, but my estimates are likely to be biased. Mexican workers
endogenously decide where to move within the US and workers already in the US are likely
to arbitrage away dierences in wages across locations. Moreover, amenity levels are likely
to explain an important part of the variation in wages across states (Rosen, 1974), (Roback,
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1982). The good weather in California is probably compensated through the permanently
lower wages or higher housing prices of the Golden State which are unrelated to immigration.
Thus, an essential rst step towards estimating the causal eect of immigration or in-migrants
on local labor wages is to include state xed eects in the regression. This accounts for time
invariant characteristics that may be correlated with immigration. A second necessary step
is to include time xed eects. These should account for any shocks that are common to
the entire US. A third step is to include state specic time trends. This should account for
the possibility that dierent states are on dierent growth paths. Ideally, we would like to
compare states receiving an immigration shock with states in a similar pre-shock trend. In
fact, low-skilled wages were quite stable in the 1990s, as is documented in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), and trends were similar across states. If anything, as will become clearer
later when discussing the longer run eects of immigration on wages, we observe that high-
immigration states have a slightly negative trend, consistent with the longer run eects of
immigration which I discuss later. This is also somewhat perceptible in Figure 2.9. This
makes introducing xed eects, state trends and controls my preferred specication.
Table 2.3 reports the results of estimating equation (2.2). Panel A shows the rst stage
regressions. They show that, during the shock, the supply of Mexican workers increased,
especially in high-immigration states. Panel B shows the OLS regressions. Column 1 is just
an OLS regression of wages on relative inows. We see that the coecient is not statistically
dierent from 0. A number of reasons might account for this, from dierent amenity levels
to the endogenous sorting of Mexicans within the US. Thus, these numbers are not very
informative about the causal eect of immigration on wages. In Column 2, I include state and
time xed eects. We already observe that when making within-state comparisons, wages are
lower when inows are larger. In column 3 I incorporate GDP, exports and employment levels
as controls, while in column 4 I include state-specic time trends. The estimates from these
OLS regressions suggest that a 1 percent increase in the supply of low skilled workers reduces
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Table 2.3: The causal eect of a local labor supply shock on wages
Mexican Shock
Panel A: First Stage
Dep. Variable: Relative Mexican Inow
shock x share 1980 1.173*** 0.381*** 0.379*** 0.373***
0.135 0.069 0.069 0.067
State and time FE no yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes
State trends no no no yes
Panel B: OLS Regressions
Dep. Variable: Average Weekly Wage
Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mexican Inow 0.405* -1.135* -1.061* -0.896* 1.616*** 0.037 0.243 0.539
0.243 0.632 0.632 0.498 0.231 0.652 0.638 0.439
State and time FE no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no no yes
Panel C: IV Regressions
Dep. Variable: Average Weekly Wage
Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mexican Inow -0.181 -1.222** -1.189** -1.419*** 0.970 0.155 0.455 0.398
0.465 0.578 0.588 0.516 0.668 0.859 0.812 0.771
F-stat First Stage 76.056 30.749 30.493 30.997 76.056 30.749 30.493 30.997
State and time FE no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no no yes
Panel D: IV Regressions, First Dierences
Dep. Variable: ∆ Average Weekly Wage
Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Mexican Inow -2.009** -1.607** -1.501** 0.323 0.319 0.419
0.797 0.716 0.731 0.698 0.695 0.665
F-stat First Stage 78.674 30.875 31.051 78.674 30.875 31.051
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no yes yes no yes yes
State FE no no yes no no yes
Notes: Nmex = 357. shock is a dummy for the year 1995. shock share 1980 is the interaction between
the shock variable and the share of Mexicans by state in 1980. The IV specication is as discussed in the
text. It is an interaction of a dummy for 1995 and the share of Mexicans in 1980. For the Mexican
regressions, I obtain the same results when using the interaction of a dummy for 1995, 1996 and 1997 with
the share of Mexicans in 1980. Panel regressions are at the state level between the years 1991-1999. 3 stars
represents 1 percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1 star represents 10 percent signicance levels.
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wages by around 1 percent. In Panel C I compare the years of the shock with the years that
do not experience the shock. These are the IV regressions. In column 2 I only include state
and time xed eects; in column 3 I add to those the employment levels and state exports
and GDPs as controls; and in column 4 I also include state specic time trends. In this Table
I use only 1995 as the exogenous shock period. Columns (5)-(8) repeat the same exercise
but using the wages of high skilled workers as dependent variable. Panel D shows the same
exercise but using a rst dierence specication.18 In the Appendix I use other specications,
including 1996 and 1997 as the shock periods and limiting my time period to 1992-1995
to exclude post-shock periods, while still being able to control for dierent state trends.
Also in the Appendix, I show similar regressions using alternative measures of Mexican
inows, alternative measures of wages (controlling for observable characteristics), using rst
dierences with various post-shock period lengths and excluding California or Texas from
the regressions. I also report estimates using wage data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation
groups, comparing high- and low-immigration states, playing with alternative denitions of
my treatment and control groups.19 Estimates from these alternative specications range
from -.7 to -2.20 In columns (5)-(8) of Table 2.3 I report the results for high-skilled average
wages. As expected, this coecient is essentially 0, suggesting that the Mexican shock only
aected low-skilled workers. Thus, all these estimates suggest that:
18A concern in these type of regressions is serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004). Serial correlation can
severely underestimate the standard errors in dierence in dierence type regressions. I address this concern
in two ways. First, I computed clustered standard errors at the state level and robust standard errors for
each regression. I always report the more conservative estimates, in this case the robust standard errors.
This is what Angrist and Pischke (2009) recommend. For a discussion on why clustered standard errors may
be smaller than robust standard errors in regressions at the US state level see MacKinnon and Webb (2013).
They explain how this happens in situations where the clusters are of very dierent sizes. Second, I report
the results of running the regressions in rst dierences, as recommended in Bertrand et al. (2004).
19The highest immigration states are CA, TX and AZ. In some cases I also include IL and NM as high-
immigration states. In the Appendix I do various exercises comparing dierent sets of states and excluding
CA or TX.
20All these estimates are signicant at least at a 10 percent signicance level independently if I use
conventional standard errors, robust standard errors or standard errors clustered at the state level.
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A 1 percent immigration-induced supply shock reduces wages by between 1 to 1.5 percent
on impact.
In Table 2.4 I report the estimates of the eect of immigration on the average wage for
younger and older workers.21 It shows that the eect of immigration on wages is, if anything,
higher for low-skilled native young workers than for older ones, though these estimates are
less precise. This coincides with the nature of the Mexican immigrant shock, since fewer
Mexicans of all ages returned to Mexico and more young low-skilled Mexicans moved to the
US after the Peso Crisis hit. This will be a lot more salient when discussing unemployment
shares.
2.3.4 Substitutability between immigrants and natives and between
high school drop-outs and high school graduates
The estimation exercise presented so far rests on three key assumptions. First, I am implicitly
assuming that natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes. This means that the inow
of Mexicans directly aects native wages. Second, I am also assuming that all the low-
skilled workers, i.e., high school graduates and high school drop-outs are perfect substitutes
too. Finally, I am assuming that my counts (and other sources' counts) of undocumented
immigrants are accurate. I can directly test the rst two assumptions, while I use the Katrina
experiment, in the next subsection, to think about the third assumption.
To test whether Mexican workers and natives or high school drop-outs and high school
graduates are perfect substitutes or not, I use two simple equations:
lnwageit = δs + δt + αHispanicit + βHispanicit ∗ Shockt + Controls+ εist
21Younger workers are below 35 years old.
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Table 2.4: The causal eect of Mexican on wages by age group
Mexican Shock
young low-skilled wage
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexican Inow 0.574** -1.054 -1.009 -0.917 -1.304 -1.344 -1.475*
0.254 0.659 0.691 0.616 0.848 0.879 0.873
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 30.749 30.493 30.997
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes
Mexican Shock
old low-skilled wage
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexican Inow 0.589** -0.993 -0.842 -0.649 -0.916 -0.825 -1.221**
0.254 0.761 0.751 0.554 0.689 0.679 0.587
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 30.749 30.493 30.997
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes
Notes: All regressions instrument the relative inow of Mexicans with the interaction of the share of
Mexicans by state in 1980 and a dummy for 1995. Panel regressions at the state level between the years
1991-1999. 3 stars represents 1 percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1 star represents 10 percent
signicance levels. Robust standard errors are reported. Controls include: GDP of state, exports of state
to Mexico, levels of low-skilled young and old workers.
lnwageit = δs + δt + αHSDOit + βHSDOit ∗ Shockt + Controls+ εist
where Hispanic is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual i is of Hispanic
origin and 0 otherwise, HSDO is a dummy indicating whether worker i is a high school
drop-out and Shockt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 during the shock years, i.e.,
1995-1997. The results of running this regression are shown in Table 2.5. The coecient
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of interest is β. If β were negative it would mean that the shock aected Hispanic or high
school drop-outs disproportionately more. This is what we would expect if Hispanic workers
and Mexicans were closer substitutes than Mexicans and non-Hispanic workers or if high
school drop-outs and high school graduates were imperfect substitutes. As can be seen in
the dierent specications in Table 2.5 this is not the case. β is always 0.
Table 2.5: Substitutability between immigrants and natives and between high school drop-
outs and high school graduates
Mexican Shock
low-skilled Wage
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
shock -0.021 -0.017 -0.027** 0.004 -0.023*
0.027 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.013
Hispanic -0.275*** -0.363*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.182***
0.027 0.017 0.010 0.012 0.019
shock x Hispanic -0.007 0.004 0.011 -0.008 0.027
0.012 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.026
r2 0.027 0.087 0.090 0.101 0.045
N 23492 23492 23492 147206 29513
Mexican Shock
low-skilled Wage
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
shock -0.024 -0.014 -0.022* 0.007 -0.024*
0.014 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.014
Drop-outs -0.359*** -0.406*** -0.406*** -0.357*** -0.493***
0.013 0.019 0.018 0.011 0.034
Drop-outs x shock -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 0.011
0.030 0.023 0.023 0.010 0.034
r2 0.054 0.112 0.113 0.129 0.104
N 23492 23492 23492 147206 29513
Controls no yes yes yes yes
State FE no no yes yes yes
Sample High-Immigration States Full Young
N 23492 23492 23492 147206 29513
Note: Shock is a dummy for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. Weekly Wages are computed from CPS. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state level. 3 stars represents 1 percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1
star represents 10 percent signicance levels. Only low-skilled workers are included in the regressions. This
table looks at whether Hispanic and non-Hispanic workers are perfect substitutes and whether high school
drop-outs and high school graduates are perfect substitutes or not.
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In the rst three columns I limit the regression to the three highest immigration states22,
progressively including individual characteristics controls and state FE. We see that in these
states, real wages decreased during the time of the shock. This is the eect of immigration,
in rst dierences, identied before. We also observe that both Hispanic workers and high
school drop-outs earn substantially less. However, Table 2.5 makes clear that they are
not aected by the shock dierentially. Column 4 in Table 2.5 shows the same regression
without limiting the sample to high-immigration states. If reallocation were suciently fast,
the eects would perhaps have been felt in the entire country and not so much in high-
immigration states alone. This is not the case. Finally, I include all states in the country
but I limit my sample to younger workers, since they tend to be more mobile and are the ones
receiving a larger shock at the national level. Again, we do not observe a dierential eect
on Hispanic or high school drop-outs, suggesting that my assumption of perfect substitution
was adequate. As mentioned before these two elasticities are key to knowing how many
workers are absorbing the immigration shock in the US. As emphasized in Card (2009) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), high school drop-outs and high school graduates form together a
much larger pool of workers (more than 50 percent of the US labor force) than high school
drop-outs. If these two groups are homogeneous then, the immigration of Mexicans -who are
mainly high school drop-outs- spreads among many more natives. Similarly, whether natives
and immigrants are perfect substitutes or not is key to understanding whether it is mainly
former immigrants who suer the labor market consequences of new waves of immigration
or whether natives also experience some eects. Like Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri
(2012) but contrary to Borjas (2003) my results suggest that high school drop-outs and high
school graduates are perfect substitutes. Unlike Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012),
these results suggest that, at least for low-skilled workers, natives and immigrants are indeed




2.3.5 Hurricane Katrina as an alternative natural experiment
The fact that Mexican and native low-skilled workers are perfect substitutes also means
that I can use the Katrina experiment to see if the current estimates of Mexican inows
are accurate. Given that the shocks are similar, namely, an unexpected inow of low-skilled
workers into some US states, we would expect similar wage eects. This is shown in Table
2.6. The estimates from this alternative exercise are similar in magnitude to the Mexican
shock. If anything, they tend to be larger, perhaps reecting the direct eect of Katrina on
states neighboring Louisiana and Mississippi or the lower productivity of Mexican low-skilled
workers.
It is worth noting that the wage eects are only concentrated on low-skilled workers,
like in the Mexican case. High-skilled workers' wages were not aected by the inow of
low-skilled workers, as shown in columns (5)-(8) of Table 2.6.
2.3.6 Unemployment shares
Though the main focus of the literature on immigration has been on wages, it is likely
that immigration also aects other labor market outcomes. In this section I show that
the immigrants from the Mexican Peso Crisis also had eects on low-skilled unemployment
shares. As I argued before, the Mexicans that now moved into the US were not only low-
skilled but also young. This is why younger low-skilled native workers were particularly
aected by the unexpectedly large Mexican inows. Older workers, even if they saw their
real wages decrease because fewer low-skilled Mexicans returned to Mexico in 1995, were less
aected in terms of unemployment shares. I show this in what follows.
To explore the eects of the Mexican shocks on unemployment shares I run the following
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Table 2.6: The causal eect of a local labor supply shock on wages
Katrina Shock
Panel A: First Stage
Dep. Variable: Relative Katrina Workers Inow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
shock x share 2000 0.186*** 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.148***
0.043 0.037 0.035 0.043
L.shock x share 2000 0.327*** 0.283** 0.277** 0.282**
0.097 0.118 0.117 0.128
State and time FE no yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes
State trends no no no yes
Panel B: OLS Regressions
Dep. Variable: Average Weekly Wage
Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inow Katrina -10.568*** -1.703*** -1.698*** -1.133 -13.008 -0.466 0.334 -0.010
2.160 0.534 0.558 0.686 7.994 0.682 0.402 0.646
State and time FE no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no no yes
Panel C: IV Regressions
Dep. Variable: Average Weekly Wage
Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inow Katrina -2.904 -1.815*** -1.749*** -1.957*** 1.110 -0.501 -0.240 0.165
2.909 0.615 0.648 0.430 4.315 1.066 1.317 0.767
F-Stat 10.307 10.515 12.090 7.406 10.307 10.515 12.090 7.406
State and time FE no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: Nkat = 441. The IV specication is as discussed in the text. It is an interaction of a dummy for
2005 and 2006 with the Louisiana and Mississippi worker shares in 2000. Panel regressions are at the state
level between years 2003-2011. 3 stars represents 1 percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1 star
represents 10 percent signicance levels. Wages are average (log) state weekly wages. Regressions are
weighted by the number of observations in the state and robust standard errors clustered at the state level
are reported. Controls include: GDP, employment levels.
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regression:
Unemployment Sharest = α + β ∗ Relative Mexican Inowst + Controlsst + εst (2.3)
where the unemployment share is computed as the share of native workers who are
unemployed over the entire working age population and where the relative Mexican inow
is computed as before. To investigate whether younger or older workers are more aected,
I compute the unemployment shares either using the entire population, only young workers
or only old workers.
Table 2.7 shows the results of this regression. In the rst column I report the simple
OLS regression. In the cross state comparison, states with more immigrants seem to have
higher unemployment shares. This is not very informative on the causal eect of immigration
on unemployment shares, since other reasons could explain this, like favorable amenities in
high-immigration states. As in previous tables, I introduce state and time xed eects in
column 2, controls in column 3 and state specic time trends in column 4. In columns 5,
6 and 7 I repeat the specications 2,3 and 4 but instrumenting the inow of immigrants as
done in the previous tables. The estimates suggest that if Mexican inows increase by 1pp
then the unemployment rate increases by .2pp, though it is imprecisely estimated.
In Table 2.8 I show the same regression while distinguishing by younger and older workers.
Like the wage regressions, the eects concentrate on younger workers. Indeed Table 2.8 shows
that only young low-skilled workers were aected in 1995.
2.3.7 Reallocation of workers
How do these labor market eects translate into how labor reallocates across space? The most
important critique of the cross-state or cross-city comparisons in the immigration literature
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Table 2.7: The causal eect of Mexican inows on unemployment shares
Mexican Shock
Unemployment Share
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexican Inow 0.173*** 0.137 0.091 0.147 0.186 0.192 0.211
0.052 0.151 0.145 0.119 0.135 0.131 0.133
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 30.749 30.493 30.997
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the unemployment share of low-skilled workers. All regressions
instrument the relative inow of Mexicans with the interaction of the share of Mexicans by state in 1980
and a dummy for 1995. Panel regressions at the state level between years 1991-1999. 3 stars represents 1
percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1 star represents 10 percent signicance levels. Robust standard
errors are reported. Controls include: GDP of state, exports of state to Mexico, levels of low-skilled young
and old workers.
is that workers relocate when hit by negative wage shocks (Borjas et al., 1996). This is what
the spatial equilibrium literature would also suggest. The exogenous immigration shock of
1995 is unevenly distributed across US states, oering an opportunity to see how workers
relocate from high-immigration states (HIS) to low-immigration states (LIS) when hit by an
unexpected inow of low skilled workers.
Figure 2.10 shows suggestive evidence that this is the case. It shows a plot of the evolution
of the share of native low-skilled working age population in high- and low-immigration states.
Several key points are worth emphasizing from this gure. First, the share of native low-
skilled workers keeps decreasing over the decade. This reects the well-known secular increase
in education levels in the entire US which has been documented in the literature on skilled
biased technological change, see Katz and Murphy (1992) or Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
Second, the share of native low-skilled potential workers is higher in low-immigration
66
Table 2.8: The causal eect of Mexican inows on unemployment shares, by age
Mexican Shock
Unemployment share young low-skilled workers
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexican Inow 0.089 0.306 0.256 0.261 0.745*** 0.749*** 0.738***
0.061 0.255 0.258 0.249 0.252 0.255 0.259
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 30.749 30.493 30.997
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes
Mexican Shock
Unemployment share old low-skilled workers
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexican Inow 0.160*** 0.041 -0.011 0.070 -0.072 -0.082 -0.055
0.053 0.147 0.130 0.113 0.137 0.128 0.131
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 30.749 30.493 30.997
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the unemployment share of young and old low-skilled workers. All
regressions instrument the relative inow of Mexicans with the interaction of the share of Mexicans by
state in 1980 and a dummy for 1995. Panel regressions at the state level between years 1991-1999. 3 stars
represents 1 percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1 star represents 10 percent signicance levels.
Robust standard errors are reported. Controls include: GDP of state, exports of state to Mexico, levels of
low-skilled young and old workers.
states.23 This is perhaps not surprising, but it has not been emphasized in other papers. It
indicates that when there are immigrant low-skilled workers in the economy, natives tend to
either migrate to other states or acquire more education.24
Third, in 1996 the share of native low-skilled potential workers fell less than usual in low-
23I use potential workers because I include all of the working age population to compute these shares. This
includes individuals aged 18 to 65.
24In the Appendix I show that there is no clear evidence that more natives enrolled in school upon the
arrival of Mexicans in 1995.
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immigration states while it fell more in high-immigration states, suggesting that either some
low-skilled natives moved from HIS to LIS or some high-skilled natives moved from LIS to
HIS. Another way to describe it is that the gap between the two lines in gure 2.10 is highest
right after the shock. This is precisely the eect of immigration on labor reallocation that
I want to capture in my econometric exercise. Reassuringly, this labor market reallocation
seems to have started with some lag.
Fourth, given the fact that high immigration states received positive, persistent and large
net inows of Mexican low skilled workers and that the shares of native low skilled workers
are parallel between high and low immigration states, as shown in Figure 2.10, indicates that
high immigration states ended the decade with a higher share of total low-skilled workers.
This is in line with the small long-run reallocation documented in Card (2007) and Card et
al. (2008).25 The reallocation I document in this paper is the response to the unexpected
inow of Mexicans in 1995, which can be seen in Figure 2.10 in the years 1996 and 1997. In
other words, reallocation takes place as a response to wage changes.26
The translation of Figure 2.10 into an equation is the following:
Share of low-skilled Nativesst = α + β ∗ Relative Mexican Inowst + Controlsst + εst (2.4)
where the Share of low-skilled Natives at time t and state s is the number of low-skilled
natives divided by the total amount of natives in the state (i.e. low and high-skilled). I
exclude Hispanic workers to show that natives also respond to immigration inows. The
25I have replicated the reallocation responses reported Card et al. (2008) between 1990 and 2000 and I
obtain teh same results. They are available upon request.
26The leading explanation why wage trends are not responsive to long-run inows of Mexicans relies on the
technologies adopted in the dierent local labor markets. See Lewis (2012). This implies that normal inows
of immigrant workers alter the factor use in the local production function, but have small wage eects.
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Figure 2.10: Share of native low-skilled potential workers in HIS vs LIS
Notes: This gure shows the share of native low-skilled potential workers in high-immigration states (HIS)
and low-immigration states states (LIS). This is the number of low-skilled divided by the sum of low-skilled
and high-skilled working age population. The vertical line indicates the time of the immigration shock. We
observe that the share of low-skilled workers decreases in both high- and low-immigration states states, but
that it decreases more after the shock, with some lag, in high-immigration states than in low-immigration
ones.
relative Mexican inow is the same variable as in the wage equations. The controls include
the levels of low-skilled and high-skilled workers and the (log) state GDP and state exports
to Mexico.
An alternative specication to equation (2.4) is the following:
Share of low-skilledst = α + β ∗ Relative Mexican Inowst + Controlsst + εst (2.5)
where the share of low-skilled workers is computed using both natives and immigrants.
I report this specication because it closely follows the literature (see Card and DiNardo
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(2000), Card (2005), Cortes (2008) or Peri and Sparber (2011)).27 In this case, the inow of
low-skilled workers should increase one to one half the overall share of low-skilled workers in
the rst year and then decrease the subsequent year or years if there is some reallocation.28
Table 2.9 shows the results of estimating (2.4) and (2.5), in the upper and lower panel
of the table respectively. The results of estimating equation (2.4) are in the upper part. In
the rst column we see that in general it is the case that high-immigration states have lower
shares of native low-skilled workers in the cross-section. This is the gap between the two
lines in Figure 2.10. To identify the causal eects of immigration on reallocation we need to
look at within-state variation as before. In column 2 we see that by including state and time
xed eects we obtain a much smaller relationship between migration ows and the share
of natives who are low-skilled in the population. Importantly, we obtain these results with
the lagged inow of Mexicans. If in a given year, like 1995, there is an especially high inow
of low-skilled Mexicans, in the following year, the share of low-skilled natives decreases.
Columns 3 and 4 include controls and state specic time trends to the OLS regression.
Estimates do not change substantially, suggesting that dierent states probably have similar
trends that follow the national downward trend captured by the time xed eects.
Columns 5, 6 and 7 show the same specication as 2, 3 and 4 but using the instrument
introduced before. Again, results are fairly similar across specications. Quantitatively, they
suggest that a percentage point increase in the low-skilled labor force due to Mexican workers
leads to a .4 decrease in the share of native low-skilled workers in the following year and
another .4 in the two years after the shock occurs. IV results suggest that OLS estimates
27In the appendix I also show the regression: ∆LstLs,t−1 = α + β ∗
Mex Inowst
Ls,t−1
+ εst where L indicates the
low-skilled labor force.
28It is one to one half because I use as explanatory variable the same as in the wage regressions. This is,
I am computing the Mexican inow relative to the low skilled population, which is around one half of the
total population.
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Table 2.9: The causal eect of Mexican on the share of low-skilled workers
Share of native low-skilled workers
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.Mexican Inow -2.475*** -0.310** -0.259** -0.223* -0.408** -0.363* -0.419**
0.222 0.120 0.121 0.135 0.186 0.187 0.176
L2.Mexican Inow -0.028 -0.123 -0.373 -0.299 -0.361* -0.476*
0.198 0.191 0.369 0.236 0.207 0.256
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 53.497 39.696 15.461
Share of low-skilled (entire population)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexican Inow -0.153 -0.045 0.034 0.059 0.792*** 0.879*** 0.724***
0.242 0.340 0.336 0.285 0.258 0.261 0.247
L.Mexican Inow -0.668*** 0.128 0.088 -0.797** -0.395 -0.399 -0.730**
0.233 0.265 0.267 0.378 0.289 0.265 0.323
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
F-stat 58.005 52.282 14.924
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes
Notes: All regressions instrument the relative inow of Mexicans with the interaction of the share of
Mexicans by state in 1980 and a dummy for 1995. Lagged variables are instrumented by the lagged
instrument. Panel regressions at the state level between years 1991-1999. 3 stars represents 1 percent, 2
stars represents 5 percent and 1 star represents 10 percent signicance levels. Robust standard errors are
reported. Controls include: GDP of state, exports of state to Mexico, levels of low-skilled young and old
workers. 'L.' denotes lagged variable.
are probably downward biased.29
The bottom part of Table 2.9 shows the results of estimating equation (2.5). In this case,
we observe how, upon the new arrival of Mexican workers the share of low-skilled workers
increases by more than one half, showing that the share of low skilled workers responds to
29These coecients suggest substantial reallocation. This is, in part, driven by the fact that the explana-
tory variable includes all the Mexicans that arrived to the US in 1995, taking into account the possible
undercount of illegal immigrants, as explained in the data section. In the Appendix I report the estimates
using CPS data exclusively to show that the share of low skilled workers increases almost one for one with
the inow of low skilled Mexicans and then goes back to trend as observed also in Table 2.9. Relying only
on CPS data to run the reallocation regressions has the drawback that I can only use post 1994 data.
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the inow of Mexicans and that the CPS may be undercounting Mexican slightly.30 The
following year, however, it decreases by almost as much as it increased. This brings the
share of low-skilled workers in the local economies back to where it was. This is suggestive
of interstate relocation in response to unexpected shocks.
The problem with Figure 2.10 and Table 2.9 is that they do not allow us to distinguish
between the inows and the outows of workers to or from particular states, nor do they
distinguish whether high or low-skilled workers are the ones relocating.31 Unfortunately I
can construct these for every year except 1995, because this is the only information available
on the CPS.32 To the extent that labor reallocation is taking place after 1995, this should
not aect my estimates. Still the estimates from these regressions should be viewed slightly
more cautiously, both because of the lack of data in 1995 and because the low migration
rates in the US means there are few observations each year to compute them. The estimates
on in migration and out migration rates that I obtain using the Mexico Peso Crisis are in line
with evidence using the Katrina experiment, reported in the appendix, and with evidence in
Monras (2013a) using the great recession of 2008.
To compute migration rates I use one of the questions in the CPS about the state of
residence in the previous year. Using this question I can construct the number of people
(high or low-skilled) that were living outside of state s at t − 1 that at time t live in s, in
other words the inows to state s at time t. Similarly I can look at all the people that report
that at time t− 1 they were living in state s and that no longer live in state s at time t, in
other words the outows from state s at time t. By dividing by the current population (of
a given skill level and age bracket) I can construct the migration rates. I can then use these
30See the previous footnote and the Appendix.
31Borjas (2006) suggests that relocation is both through in and out migration rates. He does not look,
though, at the response of migration to unexpected shocks as I do in this paper.
32The question on residence in previous year was not asked in the CPS in 1995.
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measures to try to establish the eect of Mexican immigration on inow and outow rates.
More concretely, I can use the following equation:
Migration ratest = α + β ∗ Relative Mexican Inowst + Controlsst + εst (2.6)
where the migration rates indicate the in-migration rate or the out-migration rate de-
pending on the specication. The migration rates can be computed using either the young
low-skilled workers or the entire population, depending on the specication. Given that
Mexican workers are especially aecting the labor market outcomes of young workers, this
is where we should expect to nd the native response. I include as controls the state GDP,
the exports from the state to Mexico, as well as state and year xed eects.
The results of running these regressions for younger workers are shown in Table 2.10:
results for in-migration rates are shown in the upper part, while results for out-migration
rates are shown below.33 The rst part of the Table shows OLS. Again, the rst column
shows that in the cross section in-migration rates are not related to Mexican immigration. In
other words, it is not the case that in-migration rates are higher or lower in high-immigration
states. When we include state xed eects and state specic time trends we observe how
this changes after the shock. Low-skilled workers that would have otherwise moved to high-
immigration states seem to do less so after high inows of Mexican workers.
In particular a one percentage point increase in the ow of young low-skilled workers
leads to around a .2 percentage points decrease in the in-migration rate of native young low-
skilled workers. By contrast, out-migration rates do not seem to respond instantaneously to
the shock.
33In these regressions I restrict the relative inow of Mexican workers to younger workers too. This allows
me to compare how many fewer young low-skilled workers move to high-immigration states for every Mexican
young worker. If instead I use the inow of Mexican workers relative to the low-skilled working force, the
point estimates of the regression are .7 and the signicance increases, but it has a less clear interpretation.
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Table 2.10: The causal eect of Mexican inows on internal migration
Mexican Shock
In-migration rates
young low-skilled workers high-skilled
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L.Mexican Inow -0.063** -0.093 -0.093 -0.156** -0.190** -0.180** -0.183** 0.131
0.028 0.066 0.064 0.073 0.082 0.081 0.086 0.107
N 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 357
F-stat 25.829 25.983 26.575 26.636
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes yes
Out-migration rates
young low-skilled workers high-skilled
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L.Mexican Inow 0.014 -0.053 -0.055 0.013 -0.101 -0.103 0.023 0.006
0.031 0.069 0.069 0.074 0.108 0.112 0.101 0.130
N 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 350
F-stat 26.279 26.442 26.863 26.995
State and time FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes no yes yes yes
State trends no no no yes no no yes yes
Notes: All regressions instrument the relative inow of Mexicans with the interaction of the share of
Mexicans by state in 1980 and a dummy for 1995. Lagged variables are instrumented by the lagged
instrument. Panel regressions at the state level between years 1991-1999. 3 stars represents 1 percent, 2
stars represents 5 percent and 1 star represents 10 percent signicance levels. Robust standard errors are
reported. Controls include: GDP of state, exports of state to Mexico, levels of low-skilled young and old
workers. 'L.' denotes lagged variable.
2.3.8 Comparing the short-run evidence from the Mexican Peso
crisis and the Mariel Boatlift natural experiments
I have argued before that my results are consistent with much of the literature. The one
study for which this is appears not to be true is Card's (1990) landmark study of the Mariel
Boatlift. Card (1990) also looked at short-term eects of immigration inows but, unlike this
paper, found essentially no eects. What explains this dierence? This section examines it
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in more detail.
In April 1980, Fidel Castro allowed Cubans willing to emigrate to do so from the port
of Mariel. These Cubans  the Marielitos  were relatively low-skilled and some of them
had allegedly been released from prisons and mental hospitals by Cuban authorities (Card,
1990). As a result, around 125,000 Cubans migrated to the US between late April 1980 and
October 1980. Slightly under half of them probably settled in Miami. Card (1990) uses this
natural experiment to assess the eect of immigration on the labor market. Using a group
of four comparison cities  Tampa, Houston, Atlanta and Los Angeles  Card (1990) reports
no eect of Cuban immigrants on any group of the Miami labor force.34 These ndings are
contrary to what is reported in this paper.
Two reasons could explain these dierences. A rst point is simply that although Card's
point estimates are near zero, the standard errors are not small enough to rule out eects of
the size I document in this paper. In addition, I show in the Appendix that his estimates
are somewhat sensitive to the choice of data set. I am able to replicate Card's ndings when
using the CPS merged Outgoing Rotation les, but when using the alternative March CPS
supplements I nd that average wages of low skilled workers decreased by almost 8 percent
while wages of high skilled workers increased by 4 percent. Both estimates are, however,
imprecise. The results using the Mexican shock are not dependent on the data set I use, as
can be seen in the Appendix.
Second and perhaps more importantly, as Card (1990) acknowledges, the nature of the
Marielitos  who were perhaps not ready to enter the labor market immediately  and the
particularities of Miami may, in part, explain why there is no evidence of a negative eect
on wages. By contrast, Mexicans moving to the US in 1995 do not appear to be specially
selected nor did they migrate to a singular local labor market, and therefore, their eects
34Card distinguishes by racial groups and quartiles in the wage distribution.
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may be more representative of the eects of low skilled immigrants in the US.
2.4 Long-run eects of immigration
The fact that there is some relocation of low-skilled workers away from high-immigration
states as a response to a negative shock to wages makes it more dicult to evaluate the longer
run eects of immigration on labor market outcomes. There are a number of alternatives one
can adopt. Empirically, I rst show the evolution of low-skilled wage in high- relative to low-
immigration states. I then show the wage changes over the decade of the 1990s in the dierent
states and relate them to Mexican immigrant inows. Finally, I abstract from locations and
assume, as Borjas (2003) does, that dierent age cohorts suer the shock dierently. In this
case, while both younger and older workers suered from the immigration shock, we can
compare whether workers entering the labor market in higher or lower immigration years
have lower wages or not in 2000, relative to similar workers in 1990. A nal alternative is to
use the reported short-run estimates on the local labor demand elasticity and the sensitivity
of native internal migration rates to local wages in a model built around these two key
parameters. I can then calibrate the model and perform counterfactual exercises. I show the
empirical strategies in the coming subsections, while I leave the discussion of the model for
the last part of the paper.
2.4.1 Empirical investigation of the longer run eects on wages
Wage Dynamics
Figure 2.9, previously shown, suggests that wages recovered their pre-shock trends by 1998.
We can generalize this gure by grouping the high-immigration states and running the fol-
lowing regression:
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lnwageist = δs + δt +
∑
t
βtδtHISs + Controls+ εist
where HISs indicates whether the state is a high-immigration state, δs are state xed
eects and δt are year xed eects. Figure 2.11 plots the coecients of the interaction of
year xed eects and the high-immigration state dummy, which is the dierential eect of
each year on wages of workers in high-immigration states:
Figure 2.11: Wage dierential by year
Notes: This graph reports the coecient of a regression of (log) weekly wages at the individual level on the
interaction between year dummies and an indicator dummy for high-immigration states. 1991 is the
omitted year. The regression does not allow for a dierent time trend between high- and low-immigration
states.
The graph shows that in high-immigration states, wages of low-skilled workers were
around .05 log points lower before 1994. In 1995, they were almost .1 log points lower and
they continued at this level until 1997. In 1998 they returned to the original .05 log points.
To some extent this Figure is very similar to the raw wages shown in Figure 2.9. It conrms,
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that, if anything, low-skilled wages may have a slightly decreasing trend in high-immigration
states, something that may well be a consequence of immigration itself.35
Long-run eect on wages in decennial data
Table 2.3 identies the eect of immigration on wages from very short-run comparisons. The
identication comes from the drop in wages of the specic group of workers, i.e., low-skilled,
who are competing more closely with the Mexican arrivals. Figures 2.9 and 2.11 suggest
that wages may have recovered in high-immigration states after the shock, at least to some
extent. We can also see this by replicating some of the results in the literature, in particular
Altonji and Card (1991).
Figure 2.12 shows the average weekly wage distribution of low-skilled workers in New
York and California in 1990 and 2000. There are a few things worth noting. First, real
wages of low-skilled workers decreased slightly during the 1990s. Second, they did more so
for younger workers, something that coincides with the age of the Mexicans that migrated to
the US during this period. Third, the wage of younger low-skilled workers did not decrease
more in California (a high-immigration state) than in New York (where Mexican immigration
is much less important). This is suggestive that Mexican inows did not aect dierent
states dierently, but that they might have aected the wages of younger low-skilled workers
disproportionately. Oreopoulos et al. (Forthcoming) suggest that labor market conditions
of workers entering the labor force have lasting consequences. If this is true and there is
substantial mobility of workers across space in response to wage changes, we should expect
little or no eects of Mexican workers across local labor markets, but stronger wage eects
for those low-skilled workers that experienced larger inows of Mexicans when entering the
labor force.
35If I allow for a high-immigration specic trend then the only estimates that are distinguishable from 0
are the ones for 1995-1997.
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Figure 2.12: Low-skilled wages distribution in selected states
Notes: This gure shows the wage of native low-skilled workers by age for California and New York. The
wage distributions have been smoothed using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.
It is easy to translate the gure into a regression framework:
ln(wagea,s,2000)− ln(wagea,s,1990) = α+β ∗%∆ in Lab. Force by Mexa,s+δa+δs+εa,s (2.7)
where %∆ in Lab. Force by Mexa,s =
Mexican Inows in 90sa,s
Labor force in 1990a,s
is the labor supply shock in-
duced by immigration, and ln(wagea,s,2000)− ln(wagea,s,1990) is the change in native average
wages of cohort a in state s between 1990 and 2000. I limit this regression to low-skilled
workers.
This specication is very similar to the ones used in Card (2001) or Altonji and Card
(1991) and in Borjas (2003). Altonji and Card (1991) emphasize the spatial component, i.e.,
they assume that low-skilled workers of all ages are perfect substitutes and immobile, at least
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to some extent, across space. In terms of this regression, it means that they omit the age
variation. Borjas (2003) instead assumes that workers are perfectly mobile and that workers
are good substitutes only within their age cohorts. This is to say, he omits the variation in
s.
To interpret the previous regression in a causal way we need to nd good instruments.
Mexicans might be selecting particular states to take advantage of good economic oppor-
tunities. Also, Mexicans of a particular age might be selecting specic states if the wages
for their age group are particularly favorable or may decide not to migrate if their labor
market prospects in the US are or become less favorable in particular states. This is why I
instrument these regressions. As in previous literature, I use the geographic distribution in
the previous decade (1980) to predict where the Mexicans will move to.
In the rst two columns of the upper panel of Table 2.11 I show the spatial comparisons.
Column 1 shows that a simple OLS regression of the change in wages in the immigration-
induced labor supply change is likely to be biased. Mexicans are choosing what locations to
move to and natives are likely to respond to Mexican inows. Column 2 instruments using
the migration network instrument. As found in the literature, this makes the coecient
slightly more negative and in this case, statistically dierent from 0. It suggests that states
that received earlier and probably more persistent immigration shocks are the ones whose
low-skilled wages decreased more. Instrumenting also increases substantially the amount of
variation explained, suggesting that although most of the short-run wage eects previously
estimated are dissipated across space, we are still able to nd some traces in the cross state
regressions. In other words, states that started with higher immigration levels have a slightly
more negative trend in low-skilled wages.
Interestingly, the rst two columns of the bottom part of Table 2.11 show a very dierent
picture of the impact of Mexican migration on high-skilled wages. The IV specication
suggests no causal eect of low-skilled immigration on high-skilled wages. The fact that
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Table 2.11: Long-run eect of Mexican immigration on low-skilled wages
Cross-State Cross-Age
low-skilled
Dep. Var: %∆ in Native wage between 1990-2000
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mexican Inow -0.082 -0.187** -0.446*** -0.525***
in the 1990s 0.092 0.083 0.033 0.054
F-stat 56.054 197.951
r2 0.058 0.359 0.256 0.248
Cross-State Cross-Age
high-skilled
Dep. Var: %∆ in Native wage between 1990-2000
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mexican Inow 0.169*** -0.083 0.086 -0.158
in the 1990s 0.060 0.067 0.134 0.155
F-stat 37.594 200.572
r2 0.212 0.157 0.004 -0.031
First Stage
Dep. Variable: Mexican Inow in the 1990s
OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted Mexican 0.338*** 0.394***
Inow 0.045 0.028
r2 0.830 0.795
N 51 51 48 48
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the percentage change in native low-skilled weekly wage
on the change in labor supply accounted for the Mexicans arriving in the US between 1990 and 2000. The
IV for the cross-state comparisons is the immigration networks, while the IV for the cross-age comparisons
is the interaction between the age distribution of immigrants and the aggregate yearly inows in the 1990s.
I use 48 age categories and 50+1 states. 3 stars represents 1 percent, 2 stars represents 5 percent and 1 star
represents 10 percent signicance levels. Robust standard errors are reported. Regressions are weighted by
the number of observations in the state or age category used to compute wages. The upper part reports the
results of the Mexican induced change in the low-skilled labor force on low-skilled wages, while the bottom
part shows the same low-skilled labor shock on high-skilled wages.
with the OLS regression I obtain a positive and statistically signicant coecient probably
means that new inows of Mexicans moved towards states where the high-skilled wages were
growing.
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In the last two columns of Table 2.11 I show the age comparisons. Again, I restrict the
upper part of the table to low-skilled workers and the bottom part to high-skilled ones. Given
that the age distribution of Mexicans migrating to the US is fairly stable across years, we can
use it together with the yearly aggregate inows to predict what age groups suered a larger
immigration shock when entering the labor force. This can be used as an instrument for the
share of Mexicans in each age group. This is the regression that Borjas (2003) stresses, and
I obtain similar results, but in this case instrumented by an exogenous shock. The results of
this exercise are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.11. In Column 3 I report the simple
OLS regression. The coecient might again be biased because re-emigration rates or other
labor market outcomes may readjust as a response to the migration shocks. In Column 4
we see the likely magnitude of this bias. These ndings apply, as one would expect, only to
low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers entering the labor force with high Mexican inows
did not see any eect on their wages.
The last part of Table 2.11 shows the rst stage regression. We observe that the predicted
inows are a good predictor of the actual inows as established in the literature. However,
the coecient in this rst stage regression is smaller than in the literature. Two facts account
for that. First, I have computed the Mexican inows from the 2000 US census using the
question previously discussed on when each Mexican moved to the US sccording to the
2000 US Census question because this reects the actual choice of local labor market of
the Mexicans in 2000. This is slightly dierent than what most of the literature does when
simply comparing the Mexican stock in 1990 and 2000. Second, I have used an upper bound
on the total Mexican inows over the 90s to construct the predicted Mexican inows.
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2.4.2 Model
While it is possible to evaluate the short-run eects using a clear natural experiment,
spillovers across states due to labor reallocation makes it more dicult to evaluate longer run
eects. In the short run, each local labor market, in this case states, is closed, so standard
models of the aggregate labor market apply (see the canonical model discussed in Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) or Katz and Murphy (1992)). In the longer run, internal migration ows
link the various local labor markets, spreading local shocks to the rest of the economy. Stan-
dard models in the spatial economics literature in the spirit of Rosen (1974) and Roback
(1982) are suited to analyzing the long run, once adjustment has taken place (see also Glaeser
(2008), Moretti (2011) or Allen and Arkolakis (2013)). Fewer models in this literature are
suited to study the transition dynamics.
Two seminal contributions introduced transition dynamics into a model with many re-
gions: Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Topel (1986). For instance Blanchard and Katz (1992)
report that wages seem to converge spatially after around 8 years, while unemployment rates
converge faster. Their model has only one type of labor, but there is a downward sloping
demand for labor in every region because regions do not necessarily produce the same goods.
In the estimation of their model, they rely mainly on time series variation, although they
also use Bartik (1991) type instruments like subsequent literature (see Diamond (2013) and
Notowidigdo (2013)). They do not microfound the migration decisions, something that these
more recent papers do using discrete choice theory. Both Diamond (2013) and Notowidigdo
(2013) have two skill types and reallocation costs, as in Topel (1986), but they model the
reallocation decision using a discrete choice model.
The model I develop in this section is similar to the ones developed in the internal mi-
gration literature (see Molloy et al. (2011), Wozniak (2010) or Diamond (2013)) and the in-
ternational migration literature (see Hanson and Grogger (2011) and Bertoli and Fernandez-
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Huertas (2013)).36 However, I put higher emphasis on the transition dynamics, both on
quantitatively assessing when we should expect spatial convergence (in wages) and how this
relates to the short-run local labor demand elasticity and the sensitivity of internal migration
to local labor market conditions, previously estimated.
The model has S regions representing US states. There is a single nal consumption
good that is freely traded across regions, at no cost. Workers, who can be high or low-
skilled, are free to move across regions but each period only a fraction of them considers
relocating.37 They live for innitely many periods. At each point in time they reside in a
particular location s and need to decide whether to stay or move somewhere else. Once this
decision is made they work and consume in that location. Workers are small relative to the
labor market so they do not take into account the eect they have on the labor market when
relocating. Also, they have idiosyncratic tastes for living in each specic location. This is the
basis for the location choice that derives optimal location using discrete choice theory (see
McFadden (1974) and Anderson et al. (1992)). In the paper, I assume that workers only look
at current economic conditions to determine their location. In the Appendix I show that the
implications are very similar to the case where workers are forward looking. The long-run
equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium in standard spatial equilibrium models, where
indirect utility is equalized across space. In contrast to more standard spatial equilibrium
models, wages may be dierent across locations in the short run.
36Similar models have been used in the macroeconomics literature to investigate the reallocation of workers
across sectors. See Artuc et al. (2010) or Pilossoph (2013).
37As written, the model abstracts from xed factors (e.g., land) that can inuence the scale of states in
order to focus on incentives in light of disturbances to an initial equilibrium.
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A simplied version of the model
To begin building the main intuitions of the model, I describe a graphical version of the 2
region case, to then generalize it to many regions and provide the analytical details. In this
simple case, where there are only two locations, the model can be easily represented in a
graph. I call these region 1 or high-immigration state (HIS) and region 2 or low-immigration
states state (LIS). Region 2 is denoted by an asterisk.
Figure 2.13: Graphical representation of the model with 2 regions
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Notes: This gure shows the model in the special case of two regions. The left panel shows the long-run
equilibrium without migration. The right panel shows how the equilibrium changes when there is an inow
of immigrants.
Figure 2.13 shows a simple graphical representation of this model. The right panel shows
the equilibrium before immigrants arrive. In the left axis we have the wages in the rst
region, while the right axis denotes the wages in the second region. With two factors of
production that are imperfectly mobile, the labor demand is downward sloping. With two
regions the labor demand in one region is the labor supply in the other region, like in the
specic factors model (see for example Borjas (1995)). Where these meet is the equilibrium
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wage in the national labor market, denoted by ω0.38 The horizontal axis determines how
many people live in each of the two regions of this economy. Since the model has two factors
of production, it is worth noting that I only represent one of the two labor markets. A
similar graph applies to the labor market for high-skilled workers. The two markets are
linked through the production function which in turn determines the shape and the position
of the local demand curve. If the demand for high-skilled workers decreases in one location,
so does the demand for low-skilled workers.
The right panel of Figure 2.13 shows the case of an exogenous increase in the number
of low-skilled workers in region 1 of 2 percent of region's 1 population, or 1 percent of the
national population. This is shown by the increase Mex in the x-axis. In the short run,
factors are xed, so wages absorb the shock. This creates a wedge between the low-skilled
wages in regions 1 and 2, indicated by ω∗1 and ω1 respectively. In the similar graph, but for
high-skilled workers, the increase in low-skilled workers translates into higher demand for
high-skilled workers, increasing their wage on impact.
Over the longer run workers move, equating the wage across locations. This is denoted
in Figure 2.13 as ω2. The gure also shows the magnitudes that I nd in the two region
symmetric case. In particular it shows that an increase in the labor supply in one region of 2
percent decreases wages by 2 percent. Over the long run, wages decrease by only 1 percent.
A graphical representation of this adjustment is represented in Figure 2.14. In Figure 2.14 I
have labelled time as months, but in the absence of a specic estimation this is an arbitrary
choice.
In the rst chapter I already introduced the details of the model. The one I use here is
the two factor version, with amenities that vary by skill.
38Instead of using wages in the vertical axis I could have generalized by allowing amenities to be dierent
across locations. To include amenities we only need to read ω as the wage multiplied by the local amenities.
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Figure 2.14: Path of adjustment to an unexpected labor supply shock
Notes: This gure shows the evolution of wages and employment in a two region world where
high-immigration state (HIS) receives an unexpected immigration shock. Wages decrease on impact in HIS
and slowly converge to wages in the low-immigration states state (LIS) as low-skilled labor relocates away
from HIS.
Calibration
The model can be used to explore various counterfactuals. First, I explain what would have
happened if there had not been a Peso Crisis in late 1994. In this case Mexican immigration
would have probably arrived at the same pace as in other years of the 1990s and wages would
have not dropped signicantly more in 1995 in California and other high-immigration states.
In the second counterfactual I analyze what would have happened if a state like Arizona
had managed to eectively stop its inow of Mexican immigrants. In this case, the direct
eect of Mexican immigration would have disappeared and Arizona would have suered the
consequences of immigration only through the reallocation of natives after the shock in other
states. Before doing these exercises, however, I describe how I calibrate the model to the
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data.
There are 3+51*4=207 parameters in the model: {σ, λ, η, θs, Ahs , Als, Bs}. σ is the elas-
ticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers in the production function. The
wage regressions can be used to estimate this parameter. The estimates suggest that this
elasticity is around 1, which I use in my calibration. By doing so, I am choosing a parameter
that is within the range of parameters estimated in the wage regressions, but in the lower
end. This implies that in the calibration I will nd smaller wage eects than in the raw data,
if the model is a good representation of reality and my estimates are accurate. There is an
extra benet in choosing σ = 1: the CES function collapses to the well known Cobb-Douglas
case.
The second parameter is also estimated using the in-migration equations. The estimated




in the model and around .2 in the data. Given that
the in-migration rate is around 3-4 percent, a reasonable value of λ is between 1/10 and
1/5. I use the conservative value of λ = 1/5. In the Appendix I show that I obtain a similar
parameter when using the Katrina shock instead of the Mexican one. Also, in Monras (2013a)
I estimate a similar value, using an identication strategy relying on the 2008 crisis.
I calibrate the rest of the parameters to match Census data in 1990. In particular, I use







when σ = 1, i.e. when the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then, θs = 1/(1 +
(wsLs/hsHs)). In an aggregate economy this would also coincide with the share of high-
skilled workers. While this need not be true at the state level, Figure 2.15 shows that there
is also a tight relation between the share of high-skilled workers and the weight of high-skilled
workers in the local production function.
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Figure 2.15: Share of high-skilled workers and production technology
Notes: This gure shows the share of high-skilled workers and the calibrated θs in 1990.
The next set of parameters that I calibrate are the state-specic productivity levels. To
nd those I use the fact that, in perfect competition, the total wage bill should be equal
to total production. Since total production is the productivity times the Cobb-Douglas
production function, I can obtain productivities simply by dividing the total wage bill by
the Cobb-Douglas production function given the θs and the worker levels in every state.
Productivity levels align well with wage levels, as shown in Figure 2.16.
The nal set of parameters that I calibrate are the amenity levels. To calibrate these I
assume that the US is in spatial long-run equilibrium in 1990:
Ps,s′ = Ps′,s, ∀s, s′ ∈ S (2.9)
These equations allows me to obtain As, ∀s. For that we can use the denition of




and simplify the algebra to obtain:
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Figure 2.16: Productivity levels and wages
Notes: This gure shows the productivity levels Bs and high- and low-skilled wages in 1990.
as′ωs′ = asωs (2.10)
This equation allows me to obtain amenities, xing a base location (in my case California).
This equation also says that wages net of per capita amenities is equalized across regions, a
natural feature in static spatial equilibrium models (Glaeser, 2008).39
To obtain a value for η I match the internal in-migration rate in California (3 percent).
A value of η = .88 accomplishes that.
39Following on a previous footnote, this property does not hold if instead I assume that there are xed
costs of moving across regions.
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Migration in the absence of the Peso Crisis
While at the beginning wage dierences across space might be informative about the causal
eect of immigration on wages, the shock then spreads to the rest of the economy leaving
little spatial dierences. The model introduced can help us think about what the longer run
eects of immigration might be.
I present the results under two extreme scenarios. On the one hand I show what hap-
pens according to the model if nothing else other than reallocation accommodates Mexican
immigration. As emphasized in Card and Lewis (2007), technology could have adapted to
absorb changes in factor endowments, something ruled out here by keeping θs constant. In
the model, this implies that positive Mexican inows during the 1990s directly translate into
decreases of wages of low-skilled workers in every state during this decade. An alternative
assumption is that only unexpectedly large immigrant inows matter. This is like assuming
that normal Mexican inows are absorbed through changes in the technology. The reality
probably lies between these two extreme scenarios.
Following the comparison between California and New York introduced in the empirical
section, Figure 2.17 shows what would have been the dierence with and without the shock
provoked by the Pesos crisis in late 1994 under the assumption that all inows matter.
Figure 2.17 shows how wages of low-skilled workers decrease over the decade. They
especially do so in high-immigration states like California, but internal migration ensures
that these spill over to other states. In the long run, immigration aects all locations equally.
Wage decreases of low-skilled workers vary from 10 percent in California to 5 percent in New
York or even slightly lower in other states. These results imply a slightly higher eect
of immigration on inequality than what was reported in Card (2009). As he argues, the
key to this debate is whether high school drop-outs and high school graduates are perfect
substitutes, something I have assumed here, and whether natives and immigrants are also
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Figure 2.17: Counterfactual wage evolution
Notes: This gure shows the evolution of wages in the model with actual inows of Mexicans and under
the alternative that the Peso Crisis had not occurred. In this exercise, all inows matter. This means that
the accommodation of Mexican immigrants only occurs through labor reallocation across states.
perfect substitutes. Unlike Card (2009) I have shown that Mexicans and natives are probably
perfect substitutes and this explains why immigration's eect on inequality is higher than
what is discussed in Card (2009).
Figure 2.18 shows the case when only unexpected large inows matter.40 It shows that
the unexpected large inow of Mexican workers starting in 1995 decrease wages by around
3 percent in California and that wages start to recover in 1997. The drop is slightly smaller
than in the observed data due to the fact that I calibrated the model to a slightly higher
elasticity of substitution, but it captures very tightly the wage dynamics.
40This is the case when normal inows of workers are absorbed though changes in the technology  the
θs in my model  or changes in the use of capital that substitutes low-skilled labor  not modelled in my
paper, but discussed extensively in Lewis (2012).
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Figure 2.18: Counterfactual wage evolution
Notes: This gure shows the evolution of wages in the model with actual inows of Mexicans and under
the alternative that the Peso Crisis had not occurred. In this exercise, only inows above average matter.
Migration with a restrictive policy in Arizona
In 2010 Arizona tried to adopt a law, the most controversial aspect of which was to allow
ocials to ask for residence permits if they had some suspicion that particular individuals
were not legal residents. Given that a large fraction of Mexican immigrants in the US
are undocumented, to some extent this is a policy that greatly reduces the incentives of
Mexicans to move to Arizona. Other policies as well, like Operation Hold the Line and
Operation Gatekeeper, previously discussed, are policies intended to stop immigration into
particular states.
Motivated by these policies, in this section I try to answer what would have happened
in Arizona if Arizona had had a policy that had eectively stopped Mexican immigration in
the 1990s. The link between the dierent states through internal migration, suggests that
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over the long run a single state can do little to avoid being aected by immigration. In this
section I investigate what would be the short-run gains of such controversial policies.
As in the previous counterfactuals, I consider two alternative scenarios. In the rst case
I assume that overall inows matter, while in the second case only inows above average. I
study the Mexican inows of the 1990s, and then I assume that they stop in 2000 to see the
long-run consequences. Figure 2.19 show these dierent wage dynamics. The exercises show
that in the short run, in the worst years, Arizona's low-skilled wage was maybe 2 percent
lower than what it would have been with a more restrictive immigration law. Wages are
back to equilibrium soon after 2000. This suggests limited benets from a unilateral law in
one particular state to limit the amount of immigrants in that state.41
Figure 2.19: Counterfactual wage evolution
Notes: This gure on the left shows the evolution of wages in Arizona with actual inows of Mexicans and
under the alternative that Arizona had not received any Mexicans. In this exercise, all inows matter. This
means that the accommodation of Mexican immigrants only occurs through labor reallocation across
states. This gure on the right shows the evolution of wages in Arizona with actual inows of Mexicans
and under the alternative that Arizona had not received any Mexicans. In this exercise, only inows above
average matter.




Existing literature on the causal eect of immigration on native wages seems to nd con-
tradictory evidence. On the one hand, evidence presented in various papers by Card and
some other authors would suggest that immigration has a small eect on native wages. In
the particular case of low-skilled US workers this would be a consequence of two important
facts. First, if high school drop-outs and high school graduates are close substitutes in the
production function then the pool of low-skilled workers absorbing low-skilled immigration
into the US would be large, and thus aggregate wage eects small. Second, as rst discussed
in Ottaviano and Peri (2012), if low-skilled natives and immigrants are imperfect substi-
tutes then former immigrants, not natives, absorb the labor supply shocks induced by newer
immigrants.
On the other hand, Borjas (2003) and some earlier papers question the evidence coming
from comparisons of local labor markets because they argue that the US labor market is
well integrated. When abstracting from geographic considerations, Borjas (2003) concludes
that the eect of immigration on native workers is signicantly larger than what we would
conclude from Card (2009) or Ottaviano and Peri (2012).
In this paper, I use the Mexican crisis of 1995 as a novel push factor that brought more
Mexicans than expected to historically high-immigration states to document the causal eect
of immigration on native wages. Using this natural experiment I show that a 1 percent
immigration-induced supply shock decreases wages by 1-1.5 percent on impact. This is
substantially higher than was reported either by Card (2009) or by Borjas (2003), but in line
with results I present from an alternative strategy using Hurricane Katrina as an exogenous
push factor. This is a short-run eect.
Labor reallocation as a response to unexpected wage decreases ensures that immigra-
tion shocks spread across US regions. When the relative inow of Mexicans increases by 1
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percentage point, the share of low-skilled workers increases almost by 1 percent in the rst
year and then returns to its trend. This is due, primarily, to a decrease in in-migration
rates, particularly of young low-skilled natives (a novel mechanism shown in this paper and
in Monras (2013a)). This dissipates the shock across space, helping to explain why wage
growth between 1990 and 2000 was only slightly lower in initially high-immigration states.
At the same time, I have shown evidence that, when abstracting from geographic consid-
erations like in Borjas (2003), age cohorts entering the labor markets in high-immigration
years had signicantly lower wage growth in the decade of the 1990s, which is in line with
Oreopoulos et al. (Forthcoming). In other words, this paper documents how local shocks
become national, an important step absent in Borjas (2003), and documents the causal eect
of immigration in the short and long run.
Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the model presented in the last part of
this paper, where I calibrated the model to US data and I showed how it can be used to
answer policy-relevant counterfactuals. The rst counterfactual analyzed in this paper is to
study the wage evolution that would have occurred without the immigration shock. This
allows me to evaluate over longer-time horizons the eect of immigration on low-skilled wages
in every local labor market.
The second policy-relevant experiment studied in the paper tried to answer how eective
a policy stopping Mexican migration into a particular state would be. The main insight from
this exercise is to show how rapid internal reallocation spreads immigration shocks and, thus,
the eects of such policies are likely to be limited.
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Chapter 3
Economic Shocks and Internal
Migration:
Evidence from the Great Recession
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3.1 Introduction
It is a common perception that Americans have historically been an unusually mobile people,
constantly seeking better economic conditions (Moretti, 2012). We would, then, expect
geographic relocation to be an important mechanism for American families to deal with
periods of economic crisis. Is this the case?
US internal migration rates are strongly pro-cyclical (Molloy and Wozniak, 2011). This
could imply that (most) internal migrants move to take advantage of opportunities created
during good economic years. It is less clear, however, whether internal migration also helps
in bad times. The fact that aggregate migration rates decline in downturns might suggest
that US families do not respond to negative economic shocks by moving to other parts of
the country and that instead, families remain in their current location until the economy
starts recovering. Is this true? Does this imply that spatial labor reallocation does not help
mitigate strong negative local economic shocks in recessions?
In this paper, I use the Great Recession to study how migration decisions are shaped
by the eects of the crisis at the local level, i.e. across metropolitan areas. Contrary to
previous literature  see Mian and Su (2013) and Molloy and Wozniak (2011)  I show
that geographic relocation is important in mitigating negative local economic shocks during
the period 2006-2011. In particular, I show that the relocation mechanism is decreased
in-migration rates into negatively hit locations, rather than out-migration from them.
To understand why reduced in-migration rates are important in mitigating the local ef-
fects during recessions it is, rst, important to realise that while the average net migration
rates across metropolitan areas are close to 0, the gross ows are signicantly higher. More
than 3.5 percent of households change metropolitan areas in any given year.1 Second, the
1More generally, as computed in Molloy et al. (2011), around 1.5 percent of the population moves between
Census regions, 1.3 percent move across states within these regions and around 3 percent move across counties
within state. These numbers are obviously consistent with the reported migration rates across metropolitan
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decreased migration rates during recessions are, partly, a consequence of fewer people moving
towards negatively shocked local labor markets. Third, this implies that the relevant coun-
terfactual, i.e. what would have happened had the Great Recession not occurred, needs to
take into account that more people would have moved to the negatively hit locations. This
is crucial. In a closely related paper, Yagan (2014) shows how workers who suered larger
local shocks in 2006 still have worse outcomes through 2011, even if they relocated. He takes
this as evidence that internal relocation does little to mitigate the negative consequences of
local shocks. My results show that fewer workers moved into the locations most aected by
the Great Recession. Had they done so, the wage and employment eects would have been
even worse.2 Adding this new element gives a more positive picture of the ability of internal
migration to smooth local shocks.3
In this paper, I show these results using two alternative strategies. My rst strategy is to
document that locations with larger construction sectors before the crisis (measured by the
share of employment in construction in 2000) suered larger local economic shocks in 2008.
These locations, in turn, saw their in-migration rates decline disproportionately.
My second strategy builds on the work by Mian and Su (2013). They argue that the
2008 crisis lowered the consumption capacity of highly indebted households. This helps to
explain the drop in consumption starting in 2008. Across the territory, the demand for
tradables dropped uniformly, while the demand for non-tradables dropped more in highly
indebted locations, precisely because non-tradable goods can only be consumed locally. This
translates, Mian and Su (2013) show, into declines in non-tradable employment in highly
indebted locations, while it translates into uniform drops in employment in tradable sectors.
areas.
2In Monras (2013b) I show how the local labor demand elasticity is around -1, using the unexpected
inow of Mexicans resulting from the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1995.
3As emphasized in Topel (1986), the migrants that did not move to the negatively aected locations are
themselves labor supply shocks that aect wages in location less aected by the crisis.
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Thus, locations that historically had larger employment shares in non-tradable employment
and were highly indebted at the beginning saw sharper declines in per capita GDP and
wages and higher increases in unemployment rates.
I use these strategies to estimate the elasticity of in-migration and out-migration rates to
per capita GDP, unemployment rate and wage changes at the local level. This is informative
as to how responsive internal migration is to changes in local economic conditions. Both
strategies deliver similar results. I nd that a 1 percent decrease in per capita GDP leads
to around .14 percentage point decrease in the share of in-migrants at the local level. This
means that the share of people that were previously living in another metropolitan area
(which is usually around 3.00 percent) decreases to around 2.86 percent. In New York,
the largest metropolitan area in the US, this means that around 30,000 fewer people move
into New York City if GDP per capita drops by 1 percent. I do not nd, however, that
out-migration rates, i.e. people that leave a certain metropolitan area, signicantly increase
in areas more severely hit by the crisis. This elasticity is quite similar for high- and low-
skilled workers. It is noteworthy, however, that low-skilled workers seem more responsive to
unemployment rates, while high-skilled workers are more responsive to local wages.
Similarly, I nd that a 1 percent decrease in wages leads to around .30 percentage point
decrease in the share of in-migrants at the local level. This is helps to mitigate the shock that
the crisis has on wages. If the elasticity of the local labor demand is equal to 1 (see Monras
(2013b) for an estimate of this order of magnitude) then the decrease in in-migration rates
reduces the eect of the crisis on wages by around one third. This means that had these
in-migrants moved into a city with an actual decrease of 1 percent in wages, the decrease
would have been around 1.3 percent.
These results imply that geographic relocation (i.e. net migration) took place as a re-
sponse to particularly strong negative local economic shocks during the Great Recession. In
other words, the populations of more heavily hit locations grew less than before the crisis.
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This was a consequence of lower in-migration rates rather than out-migration.
Several papers have looked at the response of local labor markets to negative local labor
demand shocks. In a seminal contribution, Blanchard and Katz (1992) argue that locations
aected by negative shocks experience permanent losses in employment, temporary increases
in unemployment rates and temporary decreases in local wages. Their identication strategy
does not distinguish between good and bad times, however. This has become an important
issue because several papers have argued that during this last recession internal migration
rates have not responded dierently across multiple locations. Mian and Su (2013) ar-
gue that, if anything, populations increased (between 2007 and 2009) in highly indebted
counties, rather puzzling for the spatial economic literature (see Glaeser (2008) or Moretti
(2011)): with free mobility, people should leave declining locations and move to rising ones.
Their ndings are explained by the fact that highly indebted counties were attracting more
population than other counties before 2008 and stopped doing so as a consequence of the
crisis.
In a paper which is closely related to this one, Cadena and Kovak (2013) show that
locations more heavily aected by the crisis (using either the construction sector or Mian
and Su (2013)'s insights as I do) saw declines in Mexican workers but low internal migration
responses amongst low-skilled native workers. They do not investigate the possibility that
worse aected locations were receiving (perhaps unusually) more people before the crisis,
particularly of low skilled workers. This is important. When I account for this, i.e. when I
examine the relevant migration rates, I nd that natives and immigrants responded similarly
to local economic shocks.4 In fact, using the same strategies but excluding the non-native
population from the computation of migration rates does not change any of the results.
Combined with the research presented in this paper, it seems that natives respond by not
4At the end of the paper I explain carefully why it is possible to obtain Cadena and Kovak (2013) results
and still conclude that low skilled natives do respond to economic shocks.
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migrating to aected locations, while Mexicans are more ready to leave from them.
More broadly, this paper is related to the spatial economic literature. Unlike most papers
in this literature, I investigate the short-term responses. It is well documented that places
where amenities or local labor market conditions improve attract more people (see Glaeser
(2008) or more recently Diamond (2013)) while locations with deteriorating local conditions
suer from a shrinking population (see Hornbeck (2012), Hornbeck and Naidu (2012) or Au-
tor et al. (Forthcoming)). It has also been documented that people respond to expectations
of future positive prospects (Kennan and Walker, 2011). In line with Glaeser and Gyourko
(2005) or Notowidigdo (2013), I show that internal local out-migration rates do not respond
swiftly to local economic shocks. However, I also emphasize the importance of the response
of in-migration rates into these places.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework needed for my empirical investigation is rather simple. Essentially
I need a model with downward-sloping local labor demand in the various local economies of
a larger national market. There are a number of ways to accomplish this. For example, if the
production technology produces constant returns to scale in the two factors of production -
land and labor - and land is assumed to be immobile while labor is mobile, we obtain the
desired property of a downward -sloping demand for labor. Alternatively, one can think that
each region produces a dierentiated product and that technologies are linear in labor in
each region (see Blanchard and Katz (1992)). In both cases, we need labor to be mobile
across regions.
Labor mobility ensures that the indirect utility equalizes across locations. This could be
simply the wage, or it could be the wage net of the amenities and local price indexes. In
this set-up, a local demand shock is simply a decrease in the demand for labor in one of
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the regions. This leads to a decrease in wages in the region receiving the shock, and some
relocation of labor from the aected location towards other regions. This restores indirect
utility equalization across regions.
This model can be easily represented in Figure 3.1, where I depict the simpler two-region
case. To guide the discussion I denote the two regions as `home' and `foreign'. In the rst
instance the market wage in both regions is ω0. This is where `home' demand for labor meets
`foreign' demand for labor. From the perspective of `home', the labor demand for `foreign'
is its labor supply. This is depicted in the right panel of Figure 3.1.
When `home' receives a negative labor demand shock, the demand shifts to the left,
causing wages to decrease. Assume workers take one period to relocate. Assume that the
decrease in wages is 1%. In this situation, when the shock hits, wages at `home' decrease
by 1%, while wages stay at the old level abroad. This causes net in-migration to decrease
at home and to increase abroad, bringing the wage to ω2. From the perspective of `home',
labor relocation mitigates the initial impact, spreading it to the other region.
My estimates imply that the net in-migration rates decrease by around .3% for a 1%
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decrease in wages. In order to ascertain how much this mitigates the eect on wages one
needs to know the (short-run) elasticity of labor demand. Estimates from Monras (2013b)
suggest that this elasticity is around 1-2. This implies that if .3% fewer people move to the
negatively hit location, wages in that location recover by around .3 − .6%. This is around
one third of the initial level. Thus, inter-regional mobility spreads the negative eects of the
crisis to the broader economy, limiting the impact in hard-hit locations but making it worse
for initially mildly hit locations.
In line with the empirical results and the model presented in Monras (2013b) the empirical
exercise in this paper shows that this is a consequence of decreases in in-migration rates to
hard-hit locations. The theoretical intuition behind this result is the following.5 When
workers are constantly deciding where to live (something that can be modelled as a discrete
choice problem where individual workers have idiosyncratic tastes over the dierent regions)
gross ows are larger than net ows.6 In the model, the probability that a worker residing
in a location s decides to move to s′ depends on the wage and amenities in s′ relative to the
wages and amenities in all other possible locations  which can be summarized as the state
of the national economy. The distribution of idiosyncratic tastes ensures that there is always
someone who nds attractive to move to s′. This makes gross ows larger than net ows.
When a single location s′ (or a small set of locations) suers a negative shock, this
decreases the probability that all the workers not living in s′ are attracted to s′, decreasing
the in-migration rates to s′. Instead, the probability of people in s′ leaving s′ is only aected
because the change in wages in s′ aects the general state of the national economy. If there
are many regions in the national economy, the eect of a change in wages in s′ on the general
state of the economy is small. This makes out-migration rates respond less than in-migration
5See Monras (2013b) the full model and an analysis of the properties of the model.
6A result also obtained in (Artuc et al., 2010), among others.
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rates. This is what I document in the empirical part of the paper.
3.3 Empirics
3.3.1 Data
For this paper I employ to two main data sources. I use the American Community Survey
data from Ruggles et al. (2008) to compute migration rates across US metropolitan areas,
and in particular information on the current and past residents' locations to construct in-
migration rates, out-migrations and net migration rates. I also use the ACS data to compute
unemployment rates and averages wages across metropolitan areas. My second source is the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, whose data allow me to obtain a measure of real gross domestic
product per capita.





Where Im,t denotes the set and the number of individuals that live in m at time t,
moverim,t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual i lives in city m at t but did
not live in m at t− 1.7







where, as before, Ik,t denotes the set and the number of residents in city k, moverik,m,t
7I use the variable metarea and migmet1 from Ruggles et al. (2008). I do not use the observation where
the metropolitan area is not identied.
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denotes that individual i was living in m at t− 1 and is now living in k and where M is the
set of all metropolitan areas in the US. M − {m} is the set of all metropolitan areas except
for m.
The net migration rate is simply the in-migration rate minus the out-migration rate.
If we limit the count of individuals to people of a certain level of education we obtain
the in-migration, out-migration and net migration rates of individuals of education e. In
particular, I use a simple distinction between high- and low-skilled workers. High-skilled
workers are dened as those who have attended college (SC), graduated from college (CG)
or attended graduate school (GS). The low-skilled are high-school drop-outs (HSDO) and
high-school graduates (HS) (see Katz and Murphy (1992), Autor and Katz (1999), Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) or Card (2009) for papers using similar classications).
One limitation of the data set is that I only possess information on metropolitan areas
of residence from 2005 until 2011. Before that, ACS reports only the state of residence and
the state of residence in the previous year. While those could be used to dene local labor
markets, metropolitan areas are a much better approximation of a local labor market.8 An
alternative would have been to use CPS data, in which both state and metropolitan areas are
reported. The use of CPS data, however, is limited by its small sample size. Furthermore,
concerns have been raised about how the US Census Bureau deals with missing data.9 The
sample size is particularly important when studying yearly migration rates since these are
usually below 4 percent. By using ACS data I can use more than 250 metropolitan areas,
whereas it would be hard to work with more than 50 metropolitan areas using CPS. For a
8Autor and Dorn (2009) dene local labor markets by Commuting Zones in order to include the entire
territory of the US; this is one limitation of using metropolitan areas. In this case, I have limited my analysis
to the migration rates of the metropolitan areas.
9Molloy et al. (2011) reports lower migration rates in CPS than in ACS, something that is explained in
Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) as an undocumented error in the Census Bureau's imputation procedure
for dealing with missing data in the Current Population Survey.
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detailed discussion of the data sources available to study internal migration, see Molloy et
al. (2011). They argue that recent internal migration is best estimated using ACS data.
I have merged two data sets by combining the metropolitan area denitions from the
BEA and ACS. The place-names usually coincide perfectly. Sometimes the naming diers
slightly but it is always clear on inspection when two dierent names are referring to the
same area. Very occasionally, the aggregation is slightly dierent across data sets. In those
cases I needed to use the more aggregate denition of the two data sets. In total, I obtained
263 metropolitan areas of various sizes and characteristics.
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
Although life-long migration rates are relatively high in the US, year-on-year migration rates
are more modest (Molloy et al. (2011)). In a typical metropolitan area, around 3.5 percent of
residents lived in a dierent location the previous year. In fact, migration rates have declined
in the last 20 years or so, as documented in Molloy et al. (2011). This decline in migration
rates continued in the 2000s, as can be seen in Table 3.1 when we compare migration rates
before and after 2008.
There is, however, some heterogeneity in how many people in-migrate or out-migrate
from various metropolitan areas. There are some extreme examples, usually in college towns
like Bloomington, Indiana or Bryan-College Station, Texas, which have in-migration rates
consistently above 15 percent. The bulk of metropolitan areas, however, are not far from
the average 3.5 percent. The same data can be witnessed in out-migration rates. In fact,
it is usually the case that high in-migration metropolitan areas are also high out-migration
metropolitan areas, again, for example, many of the college towns in the US.
Unsurprisingly, net migration rates are not always close to 0. Some metropolitan areas
are attracting more people than the population they are losing to other metropolitan areas,
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
2006-2010
Variable N.Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
year 1578 2005 2010
population 1578 530500 1069459 58743 1.13e+07
Microdata Obs. 1578 1833.619 1808.536 4 6483
in-migration rate 1578 .037 .018 .003 .192
in-migration rate, low 1578 .033 .022 0 .24
in-migration rate, high 1578 .041 .017 0 .17
out-migration rate 1578 .037 .014 0 .18
net in-migration rate 1578 0 .015 -.16 .16
(ln) GDP pc 1578 10.71 .27 9.67 11.42
Unemploy. rate 1578 .08 .026 .013 .27
Wage 1578 6.18 .14 5.70 6.59
After 2008
in-migration rate 789 .035 .018 .003 .19
out-migration rate 789 .035 .013 0 .16
net in-migration rate 789 0 .013 -.11 .16
(ln) GDP pc 789 10.70 .28 9.67 11.42
Unemploy. rate 789 .09 .029 .025 .27
Wage 789 6.16 .14 5.73 6.53
Notes: Those are summary statistics for 263 metropolitan areas between 2006-2010 using ACS data. 'share
construction in 2000' uses Census 2000 data. Statistics are computed for working age population.
contributing to their population growth. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of net migration
rates across metropolitan areas between 2005 and 2010. We see that around half of the
metropolitan areas have positive net migration rates, while the other half have negative net
migration rates. It is also the case that in every year there are some people leaving and
some people moving into every metropolitan area.10 As can be seen, gross migration ows
are larger than net migration ows.11
10The zero out-migration rates in Table 3.1 are due to sample size, and are probably not true zeros.
11This is true both across locations and also industries Molloy and Wozniak (2011), Artuc et al. (2010)
108
Figure 3.2: Net migration rates across metropolitan areas
Notes: Net migration is computed from the people that move into and out of each metropolitan area. I
have used data from 263 dierent metropolitan areas between 2006 and 2010. Source: ACS data from
Ruggles et al. (2008).
In terms of per capita GDP, we observe in Table 3.1 that real GDP per capita remained
at around $44,350 per capita, both for the entire decade of 2000-2010 and for the post-2008
years. This is mainly explained by the crisis. In 2008 and 2009, GDP per capita decreased
on average in most metropolitan areas. It increased in all other years. Figure 3.3 shows the
per capita GDP growth rates across metropolitan areas in 2008 and 2009 and all the other
years. We can see that in most metropolitan areas GDP per capita declined in 2008 and
2009 whereas it grew in the other years.
GDP per capita is not the only measure of local level economic activity that is relevant
for mobility. Unemployment rates and local wages are also very important. Several authors
have documented downward nominal wage rigidity during the great recession. Real wages,
however, decrease in some locations, even in normal times. Graph 3.4 shows that in fact
109
Figure 3.3: GDP per capita growth rates across metropolitan areas
Notes: This gure shows the per capita real GDP growth rates in all 263 metropolitan areas. Vertical lines
distinguish positive from negative growth rates. Source: BEA.
more than half of the metropolitan areas experience negative real wage growth rates. In
part this is explained by the dierent evolution of price indexes at the local level, that does
not necessarily follow the nationwide price index used to compute real wages (see Handbury
(2011)). During the 2008-2009 period the share and the magnitude of wage reductions
increased.12
A similar picture is obtained when we look at unemployment rates, see Figure 3.5. Unem-
ployment rates increased in most metropolitan areas. In fact, the downward nominal wage
rigidity made unemployment rates to change more than wages.
All three variables move very similarly. In fact if we look at the elasticities between GPD
per capita, wages and unemployment rates (controlling for metropolitan area xed eects
12See the Appendix for the breakdown between high and low-skilled wages.
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Figure 3.4: Wage growth rates across metropolitan areas
Notes: This gure shows average real wage growth rates in all 263 metropolitan areas. Vertical lines
distinguish positive from negative growth rates. Source: Ruggles et al. (2008).
and time dummies), we see that the most responsive was the unemployment rate, followed
by wages. Table 3.2 shows these results.
Table 3.2: The covariance between GDP per capita, wage and unemployment rate
(ln) GDP pc (ln) wage Unemployment rate
(ln) GDP pc - 0.38*** -0.018***
(ln) wage 1.86*** - -0.026***
Unemployment Rate -5.46*** -1.55*** -
msa fe yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes
N 1315 1315 1315
Notes: This table shows the elasticities between GDP per capita, wages and unemployment rates. Each
elasticity is computed from an OLS regression. Only one variable and the xed eects are included as
explanatory variables in the OLS regressions. * p<.1, ** p<.05 and *** p<.001.
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Figure 3.5: Unemployment rates across metropolitan areas
Notes: This gure shows unemployment rates in all 263 metropolitan areas. Source: Ruggles et al. (2008).
3.3.3 Main Results
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the (short term) response to local economic
shocks. This helps to answer the questions of how responsive migration ows are to local
economic shocks and how much local economic shocks spread across the economy through
the internal migration decisions of workers.
Before using the regression framework to look at the mechanisms of how this realloca-
tion is taking place it is worth taking a look at some of evidence suggesting that internal
reallocation does react to economic shocks.
In absence of local shocks it is hard to know how internal migration reacts to changes
in local market conditions. An easy way to see this is by plotting the change in population
against the change in wages or the lagged changed in wages. Figure 3.6 shows that there is
no clear correlation between changes in wages and posteriors changes in population levels.
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This is true both in booming years, i.e. pre 2008, and post 2008. This Figure could be
taken as evidence that population does not respond to local wages. It hides, however, two
important aspects that I uncover in this paper.
Figure 3.6: Changes in population against lagged changes in wages
Notes This gure plots changes in population against lagged changes in wages across metropolitan areas,
strictly before and after 2008. Source: (Ruggles et al., 2008).
First, there are important dierences at the local level between high- and low-skilled
workers. In particular, changes in wages of both types of workers do not necessarily coincide
and it is important to distinguish between these two type of workers. This can easily be
seen in the Figure 3.7. When comparing pre and post 2008 periods we observe that the
relation between population changes and unemployment rates becomes more negative 
places with high increases in unemployment loose population, while the relation between
population changes and wage changes becomes more positive  places less hit by the crisis
gain population.
Figure 3.8 shows that similar patterns are observed for high skilled workers.
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Figure 3.7: Changes in population against lagged changes in wages, low skilled
Notes This gure plots changes in population against lagged changes in wages across metropolitan areas,
strictly before and after 2008. Source: (Ruggles et al., 2008).
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 do not show what is the mechanism through which this labor re-
location is taking place. To see this I move to a regression framework where I explain in-
and out- migration rates as a function of local economic conditions. To this end I use the
following specication:
migration_ratem,t = βXm,t + δm + δt + εem,t (3.3)
where migration_ratem,t is either the number of people that move into metropolitan
area m (divided by the population in that area), the number of people that move out of
metropolitan area m or the net in migration to metropolitan m. When these rates are
limited to specic educational groups e it is always specied. δm are metropolitan area
(MSA) xed eects, while δt are year xed eects. I use the years 2005-2010, both included.
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Figure 3.8: Changes in population against lagged changes in wages, high skilled
Notes This gure plots changes in population against lagged changes in wages across metropolitan areas,
strictly before and after 2008. Source: (Ruggles et al., 2008).
Xm,t is a measure of local economic activity. I use the three aforementioned measures: (log)
GPD per capita, average (log) wage and unemployment rate.
My main goal is to estimate this elasticity of migration rates to local economic conditions.
I could run this regression using OLS, but I might get biased estimates if migration to certain
places is also aecting the local market outcomes. There are many reasons why this could
be the case. More people in a particular market might put downward pressure in wages, but
it may also be that the higher demand in this market is attracting more workers.
As said in the introduction, I use two alternative strategies to estimate this elasticity.
Both rely on the unexpectedness of the current crisis. First, I use the importance of the
construction sector and second, the level of indebtedness of the households. This latter
measure is directly taken from Mian and Su (2013) and is dened as the debt to income
ratio of households in a number of US counties. To obtain a measure of indebtedness at
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the metropolitan area I simply take the weighted (by population) average of the dierent
counties' debt to income ratio whenever the metropolitan area has more than the county.
To make sure that these two measures are indeed good predictors of where the crisis hit
hard in 2008 I rst present evidence on these measures and the three local economic variables
of interest, i.e. GDP per capita, unemployment rates and wages. Once I have shown this I
report the elasticity of migration rates on changes in these local economic variables due to
the crisis.
Local economic variables and the crisis
This section shows how much the crisis can be linked to either the construction sector or the
indebtedness of the households by looking at particular local measures of economic activity.
I do so by running the following regressions:
Xm,t = β ∗ shockt ∗ Zm,T + δm + δt + ηm,t (3.4)
where Xm,t is either per capita GDP, unemployment rate or wage in metropolitan area
m at time t, shockt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 after 2008 and where Zm,T
is either the number of workers in construction divided by the total number of workers in
metropolitan area m in 2000 (Construction); the debt to income ratio in 2006 (HH debt); or
the interaction of the debt to income ratio in 2006 with the share of workers in non-tradable
sectors (AD employ.)13. δm are metropolitan area xed eects, while δt are year xed eects.
Since I also break down unemployment and wages between high and low-skilled workers, this
means that I run 21 separate regressions.
Table 3.3 shows the results of running these regressions. There are at least three remark-
13I follow Mian and Su (2013) to dene non tradable sectors. In parenthesis is the variable name in the
tables.
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able ndings. First, all three measures that I use to see what the most aected metropolitan
areas were when the crisis hit in 2008 are well correlated with per capita GDP and unem-
ployment rates. Wages, in contrast, seem not to react so much to construction.
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Table 3.3: First Stage: Construction sector, Household Debt and Aggregate Demand
ln GDP pc Unemployment Rate Wages
Skill level: All All Low High All Low High
Construction Shock -1.613*** 0.332** 0.489** 0.146 0.046 0.196 -0.158
0.349 0.163 0.219 0.115 0.199 0.231 0.200
HH debt Shock -0.020*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.010***
0.007 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
AD employ. Shock -0.097*** 0.045*** 0.056*** 0.031*** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.042***
0.022 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.008
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is (log) GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and average wages in metropolitan areas. The table shows
the results of running 7 x 3 dierent regressions. 'Construction shock' is the interaction of the share of construction workers in 2000 with a
dummy taking value 1 in the years after the beginning of the Great Recession, i.e. 2008-10. 'HH debt shock' is the interaction of Mian and
Su (2013) measure of Household indebtedness with a dummy taking value 1 in the years after the beginning of the Great Recession. 'HH
debt shock' is the interaction of Mian and Su (2013) measure of Household indebtedness with a dummy taking value 1 in the years after
the beginning of the Great Recession. 'AD employ shock' is the interaction of Mian and Su (2013) measure of Household indebtedness with
the share of workers in the non tradable sector and a dummy taking value 1 in the years after the beginning of the Great Recession.
Regressions are weighted by the number of observations in each metropolitan area. Number of observations: 263 metropolitan areas x 6
years = 1578 or 194 metropolitan areas x 6 years = 1164 when Mian and Su (2013) measure used. * p<.1, ** p<.05 and *** p<.001.
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Second, the measures related to the indebtedness of the households are much more closely
correlated to decreases in GDP, increases in unemployment and decreases in wages. If the
aggregate demand channel is as important as Mian and Su (2013) argue this is exactly what
we would expect to nd. This means that we can use these measures of how hard the crisis
hit to compute the elasticities of migration rates. I do this in the following subsection.
Third, I see how the shock aected the unemployment rates of low-skilled workers rela-
tively more than those of high-skilled workers, while it aected rages for high-skilled workers
relatively more than it did for low-skilled workers. These results suggest, thus, that ight
beare pore rigid for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled ones and that adjustments take
place in quantities rather than in prices for the former group.
Internal migration rates and the crisis
Perhaps the most natural measure of local economic activity is the GDP per capita in
dierent metropolitan areas. Following the overall economy, most metropolitan areas saw
decreases in per capita GDP in 2008, as previously documented. Metropolitan areas more
dependent on the construction sector and metropolitan areas whose households were more
indebted suered the crisis disproportionately. Previous literature reports that, surprisingly,
it seems that more people seemed to move to these metropolitan areas (Mian and Su, 2013).
When thinking about population changes it may be worth taking a wider perspective.
Many cities grow over long periods. A crisis in a given city might aect its trend without
necessarily implying that the city will necessarily lose population. To see this econometrically
one would look at the evolution of the population or look at population growth rates across
metropolitan areas, as some papers have done (see Mian and Su (2013) and Cadena and
Kovak (2013)). There are a few things worth noting in terms of why this exercise might give
puzzling results.
First, as can be seen in the Table 3.4 locations heavily dependent on the construction sec-
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tor and which were (to some extent, though much less) more leveraged were in fact attracting
more people than the average metropolitan area. This may be because the construction sec-
tor or the local consumption boom attracted many people looking for jobs or simply because
for other unrelated reasons these were metropolitan areas with higher in-migration rates.14
What the crisis did was to decrease the rate at which these cities were attracting population.
It could well be the case, however, that these cities still attracted more people than other
cities, despite the fact that they attracted less people than they used to. Thus, when doing
the cross-sectional comparison of population growth rates we might wrongly conclude that
migration did not respond to the crisis when it actually did respond.
Second, the population level estimates obtained using ACS or CPS heavily depend on the
individual weights assigned to the individual level observations. These weights are meant
to make the individuals representative at the local level within a given year. Making the
comparison across years might be slightly more problematic as the way the weights are
assigned might change from year to year. Thus, when using population growth rates it is
important to be sure that the growth rates are true population changes and not due to any
changes in weighting.
A more direct way to look at migration responses is to look at migration rates. This is
what I show in Table 3.5. The results are clear. Net in-migration rates decrease when per
capita GDP decreases. A 1 percent decrease in GDP per capita leads to .8-.17 percentage
points decrease in the net in-migration rate, as can be seen in Panel C, Table 3.5. Similarly
1 pp increase in the unemployment rate leads to a .14-.2 pp decrease in net in-migration
while a 1 percent decrease in the average wage leads to a .2-.3 pp decrease.
These responses of net migration rates are entirely due to in-migration rates, as shown
in Panel A, Table 3.5. A metropolitan area with a typical in-migration rate of around 3.5
14Note that in all other dimensions metropolitan areas do not dier signicantly.
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Table 3.4: Comparing dierent metropolitan areas
High construction MSAs Low construction MSAs
Population 523,060 731,542
(ln) GDP pc 10.669 10.818
Unemploy. rate 0.065 0.067
In-migration rate 0.048 0.033
Out-migration rate 0.039 0.037
Net in-migration rate 0.009 -0.004
Share construction in 2000 0.079 0.057
Debt to income ratio 1.793 1.789
AD employment 0.226 0.202
High leveraged MSAs Low leveraged MSAs
Population 751,824 502,778
(ln) GDP pc 10.739 10.755
Unemploy. rate 0.065 0.067
In-migration rate 0.042 0.039
Out-migration rate 0.040 0.036
Net in-migration rate 0.002 0.002
Share construction in 2000 0.068 0.067
Debt to income ratio 2.297 1.035
AD employment 0.222 0.201
High AD employ. MSAs Low AD employ. MSAs
Population 742,330 512,271
(ln) GDP pc 10.739 10.755
Unemploy. rate 0.065 0.067
In-migration rate 0.042 0.039
Out-migration rate 0.040 0.037
Net in-migration rate 0.002 0.014
Share construction in 2000 0.068 0.015
Debt to income ratio 2.305 0.643
AD employment 0.223 0.045
Number of MSAs 97 97
Notes: This table shows the averages of selected variables splitting MSAs by high/low construction, debt to
income ratio and AD employment. AD employment is the interaction of the share of workers in
non-tradable sectors in 2000 with the debt to income ratio. The 194 MSAs are always split in two groups
of 97. The year is 2006. Source: ACS data and Mian and Su (2013).
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percent would see the in-migration rate drop to around 3.3-3.4 percent as a result of a 1
percent decrease in per capita GDP. In more concrete numbers, this represents .14 percent
of the population of any given city. Thus, around 9,000 less people would move into New
York City if GDP per capita in New York were to drop by 1 percent. We observe that the
estimate from using the IV specication is 3 times larger than the OLS estimate. We also
see that the adjustment to the crisis takes place through reductions in in-migration rates,
rather than increases in out-migration rates, see Panel B, Table 3.5.
Cadena and Kovak (2013) suggest that there may be important dierences between na-
tives and immigrants. I investigate this possibility using the migration rates of natives only.15
When doing this, we observe that even when restricting the computation of migration rates
to native born individuals, the in-migration rates decrease when the per capita GDP de-
creases in a location. Thus, the response to the crisis, i.e. fewer people moving to hard hit
locations, is the same among natives and immigrants. This can be seen in Table 3.6.
15In the next section I also look at this distinction by skill groups.
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Table 3.5: The migration response to the crisis: In-migration rates, total population
Dep. Var. : Panel A: in-migration rate
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.255*** -0.002* -0.010*** 0.158*** 0.085*** 0.104*** -0.155** -0.226*** 0.238** 0.333***
0.038 0.001 0.004 0.025 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.077 0.110 0.124
Dep. Var. : Panel B: out-migration rate
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
0.020 -0.000 -0.001 -0.012 0.008 0.013 -0.015 -0.027 0.023 0.040
0.025 -0.000 0.002 0.014 0.030 0.022 0.054 0.045 0.083 0.067
Dep. Var. : Panel C: net-in-migration rate
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.275*** -0.002 -0.009* 0.171*** 0.077* 0.091** -0.140 -0.199* 0.215 0.293*
0.052 0.001 0.005 0.030 0.046 0.036 0.097 0.105 0.155 0.163
Exp. Var Constr. HH debt AD employ. GDP pc Unemp. rate Wage
Shock Shock Shock
Instrument Construction HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp.
F-stat 21.372 8.718 19.065 34.333 48.799 11.718 15.361
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the in-migration rate, the out-migration rate or the net-in-migration rate, in panels A, B and C
respectively. The independent variable is either (log) GDP per capita, unemployment rates or average wages in US metropolitan areas
between 2005 and 2010, as indicated. (log) GDP per capita, unemployment rates or wages are instrument with the variable the construction
importance before the crisis, and the debt to income ratio introduced in Mian and Su (2013), see more details in table 3.3 or in the text.
Regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to compute the shares of construction. F-stats reported are the F-stats of
excluded instruments in the rst stage regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the metropolitan area level are reported. Number of
observations: 263 metropolitan areas x 6 years = 1578 or 194 metropolitan areas x 6 years = 1164 when Mian and Su (2013) measure used.
* p<.1, ** p<.05 and *** p<.001.
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Table 3.6: The migration response to the crisis: Native In-migration rates, total population
Dep. Var. : in-migration rate, natives
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.233*** -0.001 -0.008** 0.144*** 0.066** 0.086*** -0.155** -0.226*** 0.238** 0.333***
0.034 -0.001 0.003 0.028 0.030 0.024 0.065 0.077 0.110 0.124
Exp. Var Constr. HH debt AD employ. GDP pc Unemp. rate Wage
Shock Shock Shock
Instrument Construction HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp.
F-stat 21.372 8.718 19.065 34.333 48.799 11.718 15.361
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the in-migration rate of natives. The independent variable is either (log) GDP per capita, unemployment
rates or average wages in US metropolitan areas between 2005 and 2010. (log) GDP per capita, unemployment rates or wages are
instrument with the variable the construction importance before the crisis, and the debt to income ratio introduced in Mian and Su (2013),
see more details in table 3.3 or in the text. Regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to compute the shares of
construction. F-stats reported are the F-stats of excluded instruments in the rst stage regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the
metropolitan area level are reported. Number of observations: 263 metropolitan areas x 6 years = 1578 or 194 metropolitan areas x 6 years
= 1164 when Mian and Su (2013) measure used. * p<.1, ** p<.05 and *** p<.001.
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Migration and skills
Wozniak (2010) emphasizes that high-skilled workers are 5-15 percent more likely to take
advantage of good labor market opportunities.16 Her analysis, however, does not explain
how sensitive the decision is of whether to move to particular places when they have been
hit by a negative shock.
An ideal experiment to answer whether in-migration rates respond dierently to changes
in local labor market conditions would be to have a shock that only aects one type of
workers. This is what I do in Monras (2013b) with low-skilled workers. There I consider two
shocks, one in 1995 when more Mexicans than expected entered high immigration states,
and the other in 2005 when (mainly low-skilled) people from Louisiana and Mississippi were
displaced by hurricane Katrina. In both cases I observe that fewer low-skilled workers moved
into states that either received more Mexicans or more people displaced from Katrina. In
this paper, the shock aected both high and low-skilled workers.
16Literature reviews about internal migration rates include Greenwood (1997).
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Table 3.7: The migration response to the crisis: In-migration rates, low-skilled population
Dep. Var. : in-migration rate, low-skilled population
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.275*** -0.002* -0.011*** 0.171*** 0.099*** 0.110*** -0.146*** -0.191*** 0.304* 0.408**
0.046 0.001 0.004 0.029 0.034 0.024 0.054 0.053 0.171 0.171
Exp. Var Constr. HH debt AD employ. GDP pc Unemp. rate Wage
Shock Shock Shock
Instrument Constr. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp.
F-stat 21.372 8.718 19.065 24.839 36.008 6.236 9.126
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dep. Var. : in-migration rate, native low-skilled population
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.254*** -0.002* -0.009*** 0.158*** 0.087** 0.097*** -0.128** -0.169*** 0.267 0.361**
0.047 0.001 0.003 0.036 0.035 0.025 0.056 0.054 0.164 0.165
Exp. Var Constr. HH debt AD employ. GDP pc Unemp. rate Wage
Shock Shock Shock
Instrument Constr. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp.
F-stat 21.372 8.718 19.065 24.839 36.008 6.236 9.126
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the in-migration rate of low-skilled people. The independent variable is either (log) GDP per capita,
unemployment rates or average wages in US metropolitan areas between 2005 and 2010. (log) GDP per capita, unemployment rates or
wages are instrument with the variable the construction importance before the crisis, and the debt to income ratio introduced in Mian and
Su (2013), see more details in table 3.3 or in the text. Regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to compute the shares
of construction. F-stats reported are the F-stats of excluded instruments in the rst stage regression. Robust standard errors clustered at
the metropolitan area level are reported. Number of observations: 263 metropolitan areas x 6 years = 1578 or 194 metropolitan areas x 6
years = 1164 when Mian and Su (2013) measure used. * p<.1, ** p<.05 and *** p<.001.
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Table 3.8: The migration response to the crisis: In-migration rates, high-skilled population
Dep. Var. : in-migration rate, high-skilled population
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.260*** -0.001 -0.010** 0.161*** 0.073** 0.105*** -0.178* -0.328** 0.146* 0.244**
0.046 0.001 0.005 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.107 0.164 0.086 0.117
Exp. Var Constr. HH debt AD employ. GDP pc Unemp. rate Wage
Shock Shock Shock
Instrument Constr. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp.
F-stat 21.372 8.718 19.065 52.568 46.145 20.643 25.951
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dep. Var. : in-migration rate, native high-skilled population
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
-0.234*** -0.001 -0.008* 0.145*** 0.047 0.081** -0.114 -0.252* 0.094 0.187*
0.043 0.001 0.004 0.030 0.035 0.033 0.101 0.145 0.081 0.104
Exp. Var Constr. HH debt AD employ. GDP pc Unemp. rate Wage
Shock Shock Shock
Instrument Constr. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp. HH debt AD emp.
F-stat 21.372 8.718 19.065 52.568 46.145 20.643 25.951
msa fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the in-migration rate of high-skilled people. The independent variable is either (log) GDP per capita,
unemployment rates or average wages in US metropolitan areas between 2005 and 2010. (log) GDP per capita, unemployment rates or
wages are instrument with the variable the construction importance before the crisis, and the debt to income ratio introduced in Mian and
Su (2013), see more details in table 3.3 or in the text. Regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to compute the shares
of construction. F-stats reported are the F-stats of excluded instruments in the rst stage regression. Robust standard errors clustered at
the metropolitan area level are reported. Number of observations: 263 metropolitan areas x 6 years = 1578 or 194 metropolitan areas x 6
years = 1164 when Mian and Su (2013) measure used. * p<.1, ** p<.05 and *** p<.001.
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However, as argued before, there is variation in how much the crisis aected wages and
unemployment rates for workers of dierent skill levels. In particular, it seems that the crisis
aected low-skilled workers especially on employment opportunities. This then translates
into higher sensitivities of in-migration rates to unemployment rates for low-skilled than for
high-skilled workers. Conversely, the crisis seemed to aect the wages of high-skilled workers
relatively more. In-migration rates are, in this case, relatively more sensitive to wages than
to unemployment rates. This is shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
The nal point worth emphasizing from these two tables is that this seems to be true
both for native and immigrant low skilled workers, although immigrant workers do seem
more responsive, as also emphasized in Cadena and Kovak (2013). Contrary to Cadena and
Kovak (2013), however, I do nd that low skilled natives respond to local conditions. The
conicting results are explained by the pre crisis trends and how these trends reacted to
the crisis. Locations that were hit harder during the crisis were increasing relatively more
before 2008. Mexicans were more responsive both to positive and negative employment
opportunities, thus the pre-crisis trends were more positive and the post-crisis were more
negative.
This explains why both the results reported in Cadena and Kovak (2013) and here are
possible. It can be the case that when regressing the percentage change in native population
between 2006 and 2010 on a measure of how hard the crisis hit across locations we obtain
a positive coecient, while if we do the same exercise with the entire population we nd
a 0 and a negative for immigrants. This would suggest that overall the population is not
responsive to negative shocks  as concluded in Mian and Su (2013) , natives are attracted
to hard hit locations, while immigrants, and in particular Mexicans, do respond to negative
shocks  as argued in Cadena and Kovak (2013). However, if we do the same regression but
using the population change between 2000 and 2006 we realize that those were locations that
were growing disproportionately. The change in trend between 2000-2006 and 2006-2010 is
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evident both for the Immigrants and for natives. This can be seen in Figure 3.9:
Figure 3.9: Dierencial trends between low-skilled natives and immigrants
Notes: This graph shows the dierent trends in native and immigrant low-skilled population relative to a
measure of how hard the crisis hit at a local level.
In particular, the rst two graphs in Figure 3.9 show that if we related the growth rate
of native population and the debt to income ratio computed in Mian and Su (2013) we
observe that between 2000 and 2006 there is a strong positive relationship. This relationship
becomes less strong between 2006 and 2010, precisely when the crisis hits in this high debt
metropolitan areas. If we look at immigrants only, we observe that there was initially a
slightly negative relationship, that became even more negative between 2006 and 2010. This
change in trend is very similar within natives and immigrants. Understanding these dierent
trends are crucial to interpret whether only low skilled immigrants respond to local shocks
or whether also natives do, despite the fact that the relationship between native population
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growth rates and debt to income ratio is not negative between 2006 and 2010.17
3.4 Conclusion
Contrary to previous literature, such as Mian and Su (2013), Molloy et al. (2011) and Yagan
(2014), I show in this paper that internal migration rates responded to the crisis. Rather
than observing populations leaving the hard hit locations, I have documented that fewer
people migrated into the locations that suered more from the crisis. This is important
because it helps decrease the labor supply in those metropolitan areas and it spreads the
local shocks spatially.
Furthermore, I show that this is found both when considering native workers alone, or
together with immigrants. When distinguishing by skill, low-skilled workers are shown to
be more responsive to unemployment rates while high-skilled workers respond more to wage
changes. In all, this paper shows that internal mobility may have helped mitigate particularly
strong negative shocks in local labor markets.
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Omitted Proofs in Chapter 1
In what follows I proof lemma 2:
Proof. For equation 1.13:
lnPj,s = lnNj +
1
γ





































































1So we now need to know
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While the fourth term is:
∂ ln
∑
l∈S V
1/λ
l
∂ lnws
=
1
λ
V
1/λ
s′∑
l∈S V
1/λ
l
Thus,
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and
∂ lnPj,s
∂ lnws′
→ 0
